(Sub)Urban Poverty and Regional Interest Convergence by Crowder, Patience A.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 98
Issue 2 Winter 2014 Article 4
(Sub)Urban Poverty and Regional Interest
Convergence
Patience A. Crowder
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law and Economics Commons, and the Law and Society Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Patience A. Crowder, (Sub)Urban Poverty and Regional Interest Convergence, 98 Marq. L. Rev. 763 (2014).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol98/iss2/4
  
(SUB)URBAN POVERTY AND REGIONAL 
INTEREST CONVERGENCE 
PATIENCE A. CROWDER* 
Poverty has expanded from America’s urban cores to its inner and 
outer suburban rings.  In the midst of spreading hardship, new 
opportunities for confronting questions of regional equity are emerging, 
such as how best to govern our regional spaces for the benefit of all 
regional constituents, including the poor, middle class, and affluent.  To 
date, governance theories have proven inadequate to this task.  In the 
parlance of the current regional governance discourse, localists, 
regionalists, and new regionalists need a framework to make a reality of 
their seemingly disparate and inconsistent visions of local versus regional 
interests.  Localists champion the autonomy of local governments as the 
appropriate form of regional management.  Regionalists, on the other 
hand, advocate for mechanisms of regional governance to manage the 
maintenance and development of regional spaces.  While new regionalists 
have advocated practical steps to eliminate the causes of regional 
inequities, encouraging more efficient fiscal and land use planning 
cooperation between local governments in a metropolitan region, new 
regionalism as a social movement is stalled largely because it has existed 
as a set of ideals without a framework for effectuating those ideals.  This 
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Article introduces a new strategy, regional interest convergence, as a new 
social justice framework to effectuate new regionalism and revive the 
movement.  Regional interest convergence, a reconceptualization of the 
interest convergence theory first articulated by Professor Derrick Bell, 
provides a framework for beginning to address both urban and suburban 
poverty. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
“Poverty is not an accident.  Like slavery and apartheid, it is man-made 
and can be removed by the actions of human beings.” 
—Nelson Mandela1 
 
“A Region,” somebody has wryly said, “is an area safely larger than 
the last one to whose problems we found no solution.” 
—Jane Jacobs2  
 
America’s War on Poverty began approximately fifty years ago 
under the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson.3  While a 
“war” is typically defined as a state of open, armed conflict between 
parties,4 the War on Poverty pitted legislative and policy tools of 
government against not a party but, as the quotes above assert, a 
condition that lies within our collective control to alleviate.5  Of course, 
having the ability to do something and wanting to do that something are 
two different things.  Comprehensively altering the course of poverty in 
America will require a fundamental shift in our approach to poverty 
relief.  Because the dynamism of poverty manifests itself in myriad ways, 
an important first step is to make sure that we have a shared 
understanding of poverty.  To that end, I invite you, the reader, to take 
the following short quiz to test your poverty IQ.  
 
1.  Chris Williams, The Price of Politics and Poverty, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 13, 2012, 
12:24 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/chris-williams/the-price-of-politics-and_b_2105160
.html (quoting former South African President Nelson Mandela) (internal quotation marks 
omitted), archived at http://perma.cc/DS4X-8SQ9 (last updated Jan. 13, 2013, 5:12 AM). 
2.  JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 410 (1961) 
(commenting on the general planning process and quoting an unnamed person). 
3.  See, e.g., Edgar S. & Jean C. Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 
YALE L.J. 1317, 1317 (1964).   
4.  THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1545 (4th ed. 2010).   
5.  Cahn, supra note 3, at 1317–18.  
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Metropolitan Poverty Quiz 
1.  True or False.  Nearly 16.5 million people live in poverty in the 
suburb[s], in comparison with about 13 million poor people in 
American cities.6 
2. True or False.  More than 50 million Americans, or 1 in 6, are 
food insecure (do not have reliable sources of affordable and 
nutritious food).7 
3. True or False.  The pace of suburban poverty growth is more 
than twice as fast as the poverty rate in urban areas.8 
4. True or False.  The lowest paying jobs are in urban areas.9 
5. True or False.  It is easier to find affordable housing in urban 
areas than in the suburbs.10 
How did you do?  What was the most surprising fact that you 
learned?  Were you surprised to learn that there are more people living 
in poverty in the suburbs than our urban cores?  This surge is becoming 
a defining characteristic of our metropolitan regions as poverty stretches 
from its traditional home in central cities to their surrounding suburbs—
effectively expanding the battlegrounds of the War on Poverty.11 
 
6.  True.  Suburban Poverty Rate Increasing Rapidly in US: Report, PRESS TV (May 21, 
2013, 2:10 AM), http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/05/21/304565/suburban-poverty-soaring-in-
america/, archived at http://perma.cc/8E3W-TNYT. 
7.  True.  See Speakers Bureau Housing and Poverty Stats 2014, http://jim.reutler.org/hab
itat/updates/speakers-bureau-housing-and.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2014), archived at http://pe
rma.cc/93ND-758E (citing ALISHA COLEMAN-JENSEN, MARK NORD & ANITA SINGH, U.S. 
DEP’T AGRIC., HOUSEHOLD FOOD SECURITY IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2012, at 8 (2012), 
available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/1183208/err-155.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/G
HQ9-EQAR). 
8.  True.  Suburban Poverty Rate Increasing Rapidly in US: Report, supra note 6. 
9.  False.  Id. (“‘The lowest paying jobs are the most suburbanized,’ [Kneebone] said.  
‘Retail services, constructions jobs, manufacturing even.’”). 
10.  Neither.  This is sort of a trick question.  Affordable quality rental housing is 
increasingly difficult to find in both urban and suburban areas.  The rental market in the 
suburbs, however, is steadily increasing.  Today, 40% of all renters reside in the suburbs.  See 
Barbara Ray, The Squeeze is on for Affordable Rentals in the Suburbs, CONFRONTING 
SUBURBAN POVERTY AM. (Feb. 20, 2014), http://confrontingsuburbanpoverty.org/2014/02/th
e-squeeze-is-on-for-affordable-rentals-in-the-suburbs/, archived at http://perma.cc/J8JW-
KV7Q. 
11.  See Suburban Poverty Rate Increasing Rapidly in US: Report, supra note 6. 
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More recently, the economic devastation wrought by the Great 
Recession12 has forever altered the character of America’s suburbs.  The 
expansion of poverty from the central cities throughout metropolitan 
regions is a phenomenon that brings new dimensions to the character of 
American poverty.13   
This Article is structured around two symbiotic principles: (1) 
poverty is a condition that affects all regional constituents, and (2) 
poverty alleviation benefits all regional constituents.  It examines the 
expanse of regional poverty and regional inequities through lenses of 
local and regional governance theories.  While poverty alleviation is 
largely funded by federal and state dollars, it is local government that 
bears the majority of the responsibility for the execution of poverty 
alleviation programs.14  While the expansion of poverty creates 
undeniable hardship, it also creates new opportunities for thinking 
about regional equity15 and to best how govern our regional spaces for 
the benefit of all residents of the region, including the poor, middle 
class, and affluent.  To date, governance theories have proven 
inadequate and unequal to this task.  As efforts to cope with poverty are 
now firmly entrenched in the suburbs,16 an opportunity to think about 
how to operationalize regional governance theories should be 
considered. 
 
12.  The Great Recession started in December 2007 and ended in June 2009.  See Press 
Release, Bus. Cycle Dating Comm., Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research (Sept. 20, 2010), 
available at http://www.nber.org/cycles/sept2010.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/K8ZN-M95Y.  
It is “the longest recession of the post-World War II era.”  Neil Irwin & Nia-Malika 
Henderson, Recession is Officially Over, but Anxiety Lingers, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 2010, 
at A1. 
13.  Increased rates of poverty resulting from the economic crisis are not heavily 
disputed; however, there are some who dispute the notion of a “new suburban poverty” based 
upon the classification of suburb versus smaller central city.  See Joe Kriesberg, More 
Suburban Poor? Think Again, ROOFLINES: SHELTERFORCE BLOG (June 7, 2013), 
http://www.rooflines.org/3252/more_suburban_poor_think_again/, archived at http://perma.cc/
32PY-953K (arguing that the expansion of suburban poverty depends upon the definition of 
“suburb” and that what some researchers have defined as “suburban” are actually small 
central cities). 
14.  See Liz Farmer, Can Cities and Suburbs Work Together?, GOVERNING (Mar. 13, 
2014), http://www.governing.com/news/headlines/Can-Cities-and-Their-Suburbs-Work-Toget
her-.html, archived at http://perma.cc/UV3E-XBTB. 
15.  See infra notes 37–42 and accompanying text. 
16.  Alan Berube, Senior Fellow and Deputy Dir., Metro. Policy Program, The State of 
Metropolitan America: Suburbs and the 2010 Census (July 14, 2011), available at http://www.b
rookings.edu/research/speeches/2011/07/14-census-suburbs-berube, archived at http://perma.c
c/VCX8-P2MX. 
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Today’s metropolitan regions are comprised of both the urban and 
the suburban.  While urban central cities may have larger populations, it 
does not follow that urban central cities dominate regional spaces as 
they used to in the 1950s and 1960s.17  Instead, the character of a 
metropolitan region is determined by the various localities within it.  For 
example, metropolitan regions such as Chicago and San Francisco house 
hundreds of municipalities.18  
The modern regional governance debate is centered on the question 
of whether metropolitan regions19 are better managed through the 
individualized efforts of local governments or through cooperative 
regional governance approaches.20  Metropolitan regions are home to a 
diverse range of regional constituent groups, each with its own 
respective interests.  In the parlance of the current regional governance 
discourse, there are two broadly defined categories of regional 
constituent groups: regionalists and localists.21  Regionalists advocate for 
mechanisms of regional governance to manage the maintenance and 
development of regional spaces.22  Localists, on the other hand, 
champion the autonomy of local governments as the appropriate form 
of regional management.23  While these two groups are at the opposite 
ends of the regional governance discourse, there is a third voice in the 
discourse: new regionalism.  New regionalists advocate measures to 
eliminate the causes of regional inequities, encourage more efficient 
fiscal cooperation between local governments in the same metropolitan 
region, and seek to identify new resources for cooperative land use 
planning.24  The new regionalist movement, however, is a stalled 
movement because, until now, it has existed as a set of ideals without a 
framework for effectuating those ideals.  This Article considers a new 
strategy—regional interest convergence—as a new social justice 
strategy to effectuate new regionalism and revive the movement.   
 
17.  See BRUCE KATZ & JENNIFER BRADLEY, THE METROPOLITAN REVOLUTION: 
HOW CITIES AND METROS ARE FIXING OUR BROKEN POLITICS AND FRAGILE ECONOMY 47 
(2013). 
18.  See id. at 2. 
19.  See infra notes 119–21 and accompanying text. 
20.  See infra Part II.C. 
21.  Matthew J. Parlow, Equitable Fiscal Regionalism, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 49, 51–52 
(2012). 
22.  Id. at 62–63. 
23.  Id. at 53. 
24.  Myron Orfield, The Region and Taxation: School Finance, Cities, and the Hope for 
Regional Reform, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 91, 92 (2007). 
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Regional interest convergence25 is a reconceptualization of the 
interest convergence theory first articulated by Professor Derrick Bell.26  
Broadly stated, interest convergence theory explains that where parties 
in unequal positions of power have divergent interests, to advance its 
goals, the subordinate party must find commonality between its interests 
and the interests of the majority party.27  The application of the interest 
convergence theory to regional governance is a novel yet logical next 
step for constructing mechanisms to align the interests of residents of 
regional communities and address poverty throughout metropolitan 
communities.  To date, however, Bell’s theory has been largely applied 
in litigation strategies.28 
Regional interest convergence has the potential to be a 
comprehensive anti-poverty mechanism designed specifically to alleviate 
regional inequity.  It operates at the intersection of regional planning, 
local government law, economic development policy, negotiation, and 
community organizing, and provides the structure to create a blueprint 
for identifying metropolitan regional constituent groups and their 
interests to determine points of convergence among these disparate 
interests to achieve regional equity.  The Article proceeds as follows: 
Part II documents the growth and development of America’s 
metropolitan regions and regional inequities to demonstrate the urgent 
need for regional interest convergence.  Highlighting the current 
suburban poverty crisis and the shrinking middle class, Part II also 
situates this discussion in the modern regional governance conversation 
by exploring the successes and failures of the predominant governance 
theories overlaying metropolitan regions: localism, regionalism, and new 
regionalism.  Part III reconceptualizes the interest convergence theory 
to apply it in the regional governance context and presents the interest 
 
25.  While new regionalism exists without a succinct definition, there have been several 
superb articles exploring new regionalism’s impact on regional equity.  See, e.g., Lisa T. 
Alexander, The Promise and Perils of “New Regionalist” Approaches to Sustainable 
Communities, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629 (2011); Parlow, supra note 21, at 64–67; 
Christopher J. Tyson, Localism and Involuntary Annexation: Reconsidering Approaches to 
New Regionalism, 87 TUL. L. REV. 297 (2012).  
26.  Sheryll D. Cashin, Shall We Overcome? Transcending Race, Class, and Ideology 
Through Interest Convergence, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 253, 254 (2005). 
27. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence 
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523–24 (1980) (arguing that interest convergence would not 
occur if the status quo of the dominant party would be negatively impacted).   
28.  See Cynthia Lee, Cultural Convergence: Interest Convergence Theory Meets the 
Cultural Defense, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 911, 925 (2007).   
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convergence methodology.  Part IV sketches a framework for the 
implementation of regional interest convergence as a new regionalist 
strategy for achieving regional equity and navigates and explores 
practical opportunities for regional interest convergence.  
II. THE CAUSES AND PERSISTENCE OF REGIONAL INEQUITY  
Regions are becoming increasingly important in the American 
landscape.29  Unlike states and cities, regions are not formal legal 
structures formed by government action.  Instead, regions are formed 
through engaged networks of commerce and custom and are becoming 
increasingly important cultural and political actors.30  Regions are 
complex mosaics of culture, economics, and geography, with dual 
identities as “regional spaces” and “spaces of regionalism.”  Stated 
differently, a region is both an economic unit with an objective nature 
and defined geographical boundaries and a “created territory” formed 
for “political mobilization and . . . cultural expression.”31 There are close 
to 400 metropolitan regions in the United States,32 and these regions are 
increasing in national and international prominence as economic 
actors.33  Metropolitan regions house the overwhelming majority of the 
country’s residents.  Almost two-thirds of the American population lives 
in the 100 largest metropolitan regions,34 which is only 12% of the 
country’s land mass.35  Moreover, 85% of the nation’s immigrants and 
77% of the nation’s minority population live in metropolitan regions.36 
 
29.  See, e.g., Judith Rodin, Foreword to KATZ & BRADLEY, supra note 17, at vii, vii. 
30.  See id. at vii–viii. 
31.  See MANUEL PASTOR JR., CHRIS BENNER & MARTHA MATSUOKA, THIS COULD 
BE THE START OF SOMETHING BIG: HOW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS FOR REGIONAL EQUITY 
ARE RESHAPING METROPOLITAN AMERICA 53 (2009) (citing Martin Jones & Gordon 
MacLeod, Regional Spaces, Spaces of Regionalism: Territory, Insurgent Politics and the 
English Question, 29 TRANSACTIONS INST. BRIT. GEOGRAPHERS 433 (2004)). 
32.  MYRON ORFIELD, AMERICAN METROPOLITICS: THE NEW SUBURBAN REALITY 1 
(2002); OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB 
BULLETIN NO. 13-01, at 22 (2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/o
mb/bulletins/2013/b-13-01.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/B88-APGN.  
33.  E.g., Rodin, supra note 29, at vii, 2. 
34.  Id. at 1; see also ELIZABETH KNEEBONE, METRO. POLICY PROGRAM AT 
BROOKINGS, THE GREAT RECESSION AND POVERTY IN METROPOLITAN AMERICAN 
(2010). 
35.  KATZ & BRADLEY, supra note 17, at 1. 
36.  See METRO. POLICY PROGRAM AT BROOKINGS, METROPOLICY: SHAPING A NEW 
FEDERAL PARTNERSHIP FOR A METROPOLITAN NATION 4 (2008). 
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There are distinctions between regions, generally, and metropolitan 
regions, specifically.  The Census Bureau defines metropolitan regions 
as having an urban core central city with a population that exceeds 
50,000 people and several adjacent, lesser populated suburban localities 
that are highly socially and economically integrated with the core.37  It is 
important to understand the common history behind the development 
of these spaces to identify the root causes of regional inequity, better 
address its current iterations, and maximize the economic and political 
potential of regional spaces.   
Regional inequity encompasses the range of social and economic 
disparities between residents in a metropolitan region.  It speaks to 
power imbalances, unequal access to public resources, and wealth gaps 
between localities within the same metropolitan region.  Examples 
include disparities between unemployment rates, the availability of 
affordable housing, the recruitment of commercial retail, and the 
funding of public schools.38  Its causes are multifaceted and complex, 
simultaneously reflecting public policy, personal prejudices and choice, 
and the operation of law.39  Regional inequities surfaced concomitant 
with the initial development of metropolitan regions—beginning with 
the incorporation of the first suburbs,40 which were formed to be an 
escape from urban America and poverty.41  There is, in fact, a direct link 
between the origins of the first suburbs and the current expanse of 
suburban poverty that is one of the legacies of the Great Recession.42   
 
37.  Metropolitan regions are formally distinguished from nonmetropolitan regions by 
their higher populations and informally by the diversity of their populations.  Neither 
metropolitan regions nor nonmetropolitan regions are confined to state boundaries.  For 
example, the New York Metropolitan Statistical Area (commonly referred to as a tri-state 
area) is comprised of counties from the states of New York, Connecticut, and New Jersey.  
See OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, supra note 32, at 2.  The proposals presented in the 
article are applicable to both metropolitan and nonmetropolitan regions; however, this 
Article is focused on the story of metropolitan regional development.  It goes without saying 
that nonmetropolitan regions have their own unique challenges that warrant study.   
38.  See generally DAVID RUSK, INSIDE GAME/OUTSIDE GAME: WINNING STRATEGIES 
FOR SAVING URBAN AMERICA (1999). 
39.  See id. at 316–35.  
40.  See, e.g., Georgette C. Poindexter, Towards a Legal Framework for Regional 
Redistribution of Poverty-Related Expenses, 47 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 6, 10 
(1995).   
41.  ELIZABETH KNEEBONE & ALAN BERUBE, CONFRONTING SUBURBAN POVERTY 
IN AMERICA 6–7 (2013). 
42.  Id. at 35.  
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The persistence of regional inequity is directly related to (1) the 
nature of the social and political systems that created the suburbs,43 (2) 
the intransigent nature of regional inequity as evidenced by the ongoing 
expansion of suburban poverty,44 and (3) governance failures in 
metropolitan regions. 45  Each of these three factors is discussed below.  
A. The Simultaneous Emergence of Metropolitan Regions and Regional 
Inequity 
A significant reason for the persistence of regional inequity is the 
way in which metropolitan regions developed—specifically, the 
formation of America’s suburban communities.  Before there were 
metropolitan regions, the American landscape consisted of urban cities 
and rural communities.  The earliest cities thrived for generations as 
urban metropolises surrounded by lesser populated rural spaces.46  City 
populations steadily increased as rural residents and immigrants were 
enticed by employment opportunities.47  However, the complexion and 
class of the incoming residents alarmed much of the existing populace.48  
Class, racial, and ethnic tensions began to grow.49  These tensions eased 
temporarily during World War I, intensified during the Great 
Depression, and eased again during World War II.50  After World War 
II, however, city populations grew exponentially.51  In addition to rural 
residents and immigrants, African American agricultural workers from 
the reconstructing South began relocating to northern cities to find work 
in industrial, manufacturing, and service positions.52  The old tensions 
intensified but were deflected by the federal government’s new home 
ownership programs, which provided a way out of the central city for 
 
43.  See infra Part II.A. 
44.  See infra Part II.B. 
45.  See infra Part II.C. 
46.  See G. ROSS STEPHENS & NELSON WIKSTROM, METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT 
AND GOVERNANCE: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES, EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS, AND THE 
FUTURE 14–15 (2000). 
47.  DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: 
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 26–27 (1993).   
48.  Id. at 29.   
49.  Id. at 29–30.   
50.  See id. at 30–31. 
51.  See id. at 27–28, 43.   
52.  See id. at 26–29; see also THOMAS J. SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS: 
RACE AND INEQUALITY IN POSTWAR DETROIT (1996).   
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middle-class Americans.53  These home ownership mortgage programs 
were not for homes in the central cities but for newly constructed homes 
in the emerging surrounding suburban communities—creating a new 
type of space that was neither urban nor rural but suburban.54 
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, federal policies supported the 
development of suburban communities and facilitated racial and 
economic segregation between central cities and suburbs.  African 
Americans were denied access to federal home ownership programs and 
loan guarantees, which meant that they could not purchase homes and 
did not benefit from the mortgage interest deduction on their personal 
income taxes.55  Furthermore, the federal government financed highway 
construction to ease suburban entry into and exit out of the central 
city.56  At the same time, it financed urban renewal projects that 
displaced large numbers of African American central-city residents 
from neighborhood communities into public housing and concentrated 
poverty.57   
Marketed as the American dream, suburbs developed as 
communities of detached single-family homes from which residents 
drove to central cities for work.  Central-city residents, however, were 
confined to the city for employment because auto loans were just as 
difficult to obtain as home mortgages and, unlike highways, public 
transportation did not connect the central city to the suburbs.58 As the 
beneficiaries of the federal home loan programs, white middle-class 
residents exited central cities en masse, engendering the “white flight” 
phenomenon.59  Business and industry also abandoned the central cities 
to provide services for the wealthier suburban residents—decimating 
central-city tax bases.60  To compensate for the divestment of white 
flight, cities sought to salvage their tax bases by annexing some of the 
 
53.  See id. at 52–53.  
54.  See id. at 53.  
55.  See id. at 53–54.   
56.  Id. at 44. 
57.  Id. at 55–56.  See generally MINDY THOMPSON FULLILOVE, ROOT SHOCK: HOW 
TEARING UP CITY NEIGHBORHOODS HURTS AMERICA, AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT 
IT (2004) (describing the impact and physiological harm of urban renewal on central-city 
residents). 
58.  See KNEEBONE & BERUBE, supra note 41, at 7–8. 
59.  MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 47, at 52–55. 
60.  See id. at 55–56, 136, 156. 
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newer surrounding communities outside of their boundaries.61  Early 
annexations were successful; however, suburban communities petitioned 
their state governments to require both central-city and suburban voter 
approval of any proposed annexation—effectively ending that 
practice.62  The suburbs now existed as autonomous local governments 
with the same authority as central cities to tax, provide services, and 
regulate land use.63   
The suburbs were initially limited to the white middle class and 
elites,64 and stark disparities between central cities and the surrounding 
suburbs emerged soon after their creation.  From the east coast to the 
west coast, the ascent of the suburbs propelled the decline of central 
cities, and cities experienced an unobstructed deterioration during the 
1980s and 1990s.65  This deterioration was supported by suburban land 
use practices and legislation, such as exclusionary zoning ordinances that 
appear facially neutral but have the practical effect of excluding low- 
and moderate-income residents.66  These policies and practices 
concentrated poverty and trapped central-city residents, consequently 
creating a high demand for (and parallel lack of) affordable housing in 
central cities while increasing the value of suburban land.67   
As affordable and fair housing advocates and community groups 
challenged discriminatory housing practices, their efforts led to the 
construction of affordable housing in certain suburbs.68  These suburbs 
became more socially and economically diverse as residents moved from 
the central city.  As a result of the influx of mixed incomes, the housing 
stock in the suburbs also diversified.69  Single-family homes were still the 
norm, but multi-family housing and apartment buildings were also 
 
61.  See Judith Welch Wegner, North Carolina’s Annexation Wars: Whys, Wherefores, 
and What Next, 91 N.C. L. REV. 165, 168 (2012). 
62.  See, e.g., id. at 226.  See generally Tyson, supra note 25.  
63.  See, e.g., Wegner, supra note 61, at 183–85.   
64.  See RUSK, supra note 38, at 1–15.  See generally MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 47, 
at 52–55, 44–45. 
65.  Poindexter, supra note 40, at 10. 
66.  Id. at 12–13. 
67.  See id. at 14–15. 
68.  See, e.g., Harold A. McDougall, Regional Contribution Agreements: Compensation 
for Exclusionary Zoning, 60 TEMP. L. Q. 665, 674–80 (1987).  The construction of affordable 
housing in the suburbs has not been without controversy, as evidenced by the ongoing 
challenges in Mount Laurel, New Jersey.  See, e.g., David D. Troutt, Katrina’s Window: 
Localism, Resegregation, and Equitable Regionalism, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1109, 1179 (2008).  
69.  See, e.g., RUSK, supra note 38, at 168–69. 
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constructed.70  Through formal litigation and an informal shift in cultural 
norms, the suburbs became less exclusive and more economically and 
ethnically diverse.71  This change in complexion, combined with the 
1990s’ strong economy and housing boom, prompted many affluent 
residents to move deeper into regions and further from central cities to 
populate new suburban communities called “exurb[s]”72—designating 
the first suburbs adjacent to the central cities the “inner-ring or first-tier 
suburbs.”73  Now there were three categories of space in regional spaces: 
central cities, inner-ring suburbs, and exurbs. 
In many respects today’s suburbs exhibit a very different character 
from what was prevalent when the suburbs were first formed.  In fact, 
the boundaries between many central cities and their inner-ring suburbs 
are now blurred for a number of reasons, including the fact that poverty 
is now a suburban reality.74  For example, the exodus to the exurbs 
resulted in disinvestment in the inner-ring suburbs similar to that 
experienced by the central cities decades earlier.75  For any given 
locality, this disinvestment led to lower property value assessments, 
which, in turn, decreased the volume of public services that locality 
could provide.76  While fair share affordable housing laws77 and laws 
prohibiting exclusionary zoning78 made leaving the central city a viable 
option for central-city residents, the subprime mortgage crises 
undermined that goal.79  Another layer of social and economic diversity 
comes from the fact that the suburbs are also now the destination for 
newly arrived immigrants seeking to be near family who, in years 
 
70.  See, e.g., id. 
71.  McDougall, supra note 68, at 674–80. 
72.  Exurbs are generally considered low-density communities that extend beyond 
suburban communities and house affluent residents.  See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN 
GEOGRAPHY 149 (Barney Warf ed., 2006); Wegner, supra note 61, at 257 n.414.  
73.  Bernadette Hanlon, A Typology of Inner-Ring Suburbs: Class, Race, and Ethnicity 
in U.S. Suburbia, 8 CITY & COMMUNITY 221, 225 (2009).  
74.  Berube, supra note 16.   
75.  See Hanlon, supra note 73, at 235. 
76.  See, e.g., Poindexter, supra note 40, at 17–22.   
77.  See, e.g., id. at 40–43.   
78.  See id. at 35–43 (discussing the trio of fair housing cases from Mt. Laurel, New 
Jersey). 
79.  See Cassandra Jones Havard, “Goin’ Round in Circles” . . . and Letting the Bad 
Loans Win: When Subprime Lending Fails Borrowers: The Need for Uniform Broker 
Regulation, 86 NEB. L. REV. 737 (2008); Audrey G. McFarlane, The Properties of Instability: 
Markets, Predation, Racialized Geography, and Property Law, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 855. 
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before, would have otherwise resided in the central city.80  The 
combined effect of these demographic and cultural shifts increased 
suburban population growth and improved social and economic 
integration.81   
As explained in the next section, instead of the idyllic lifestyle 
promised in advertising for suburban communities, these communities 
are experiencing many of the same poverty-based challenges 
traditionally encountered by low-income residents in central-city 
neighborhoods.82  There is a persistent tension that dominates the 
relationships between central cities and suburbs in metropolitan regions, 
and our metropolitan regions are places that house extreme social and 
economic disparities.83  These disparities, however, are no longer limited 
to inequities between central cities and suburbs.  In an extreme 
demonstration of irony, many once-idyllic suburbs are experiencing 
rates of poverty previously only familiar to residents of central cities.84   
B. Expanding Regional Inequity: Suburban Poverty  
Social scientists and social service providers have sounded the alarm 
about the tightening grip of poverty in many suburban communities.  As 
discussed above, suburban communities were designed to be middle-
class enclaves, leaving poverty to the realm of the central cities.85  As a 
result of the housing crisis and Great Recession, the expansion of 
suburban poverty has spread to areas poorly equipped to handle the 
need.86  Lacking established supportive social services, the experience of 
poverty in the suburbs does not mirror poverty in central cities because 
there is no infrastructure for poverty alleviation programs.87  On one 
 
80.  Historically, immigrants settled in central cities to join families and existing social 
networks.  Carol Morello & Luz Lazo, Baltimore’s Hope: Immigrants, WASH. POST, July 25, 
2012, at A1, available at 2012 WLNR 15661334.  However, immigrants have also been able to 
participate in the trek outside of the central cities, and new immigrant relatives join them in 
the suburbs instead.  See, e.g., KNEEBONE & BERUBE, supra note 41, at 46; Jill H. Wilson & 
Nicole Prchal Svajlenka, Immigrants Continue to Disperse, with Fastest Growth in the 
Suburbs, BROOKINGS (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/10/29-
immigrants-disperse-suburbs-wilson-svajlenka, archived at http://perma.cc/4CV5-WPVZ. 
81.  KNEEBONE & BERUBE, supra note 41, at 44. 
82.  See infra Part II.A. 
83.  See Farmer, supra note 14.  
84.  See KNEEBONE & BERUBE, supra note 41, at 17–20. 
85.  See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
86.  See KNEEBONE & BERUBE, supra note 41, at 10, 35. 
87.  See id. at 10, 88–95.  
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hand, regional inequity speaks to wealth and resource disparities 
between central cities and suburban communities.  On the other hand, 
however, the high incidence of suburban poverty should not be 
interpreted to suggest an easing of disparities between central cities and 
suburbs.  Instead, it means that regional inequities exist between 
individual suburbs in addition to the historical disparities between 
central cities and suburbs.   
In Confronting Suburban Poverty in America, researchers Elizabeth 
Kneebone and Alan Berube document the spread of poverty in 
American suburbs.88  According to the authors, while poverty rates 
remain higher in cities and rural areas than in suburban communities, 
poverty grew at a faster rate in the suburbs over the course of the last 
thirty years.89  This clearly pre-dates the Great Recession; however, it 
was the Great Recession and one of its instigators, the housing crash of 
2006, that fueled suburban poverty to its current calamitous state.90  The 
most rapid growth took place in the 2000s, with the latter half of the 
2000s representing twice as much growth as the first half.91  The net 
result is that, today, there are more poor people living in the suburbs 
than in the central cities.92  The authors are careful to explain, however, 
that the purpose of their research is not to argue that suburban poverty 
is more egregious or challenging than urban poverty.93  Instead, their 
goal is to identify the ways in which suburban poverty and urban 
poverty are distinct—and illustrate the need for new and different anti-
poverty measures.94   
The economic crisis hit the poor and economically marginalized the 
hardest: theirs were the first jobs to disappear, the first rents to rise, and 
the first homes to be foreclosed.95  Suburban poverty’s higher growth 
 
88.  KNEEBONE & BERUBE, supra note 41.   
89.  See id. at 17–20. 
90.  Id. at 39–41.  
91.  See id. at 40–41. 
92.  Emily Badger, The Suburbanization of Poverty, CITYLAB (May 20, 2013), 
http://www.citylab.com/work/2013/05/sburbanization-poverty/5633/, archived at http://perma.c
c/TU92-UABR (noting that 16.4 million poor people live in the suburbs compared to 13.4 
million in the central cities). 
93.  KNEEBONE & BERUBE, supra note 41, at 31–36. 
94.  Id. at 96–112. 
95.  Kelly D. Edmiston, The Low-and Moderate-Income Population in Recession and 
Recovery: Results From a New Survey, 98 FED. RES. BANK KAN. CITY: ECON. REV. 33, 33, 44 
(2013), available at http://www.kc.frb.org/publicat/econrev/pdf/13q1Edmiston.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/H457-XXSC. 
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rate is directly connected to the breadth of the economic crisis, which 
generated massive losses of service, construction, and manufacturing 
jobs throughout the nation.96  Suburban communities suffered these job 
losses acutely.97  In addition to the assault against the already poor, the 
Great Recession propelled significant numbers of middle and higher 
income families from their respective class brackets into the low and 
moderate income brackets (LMI)—thereby growing the ranks of the 
poor.98  As a consequence, suburban poverty implicates two distinct 
populations: (i) poor residents already residing in or moving to 
suburban communities from the central cities (the “traditional LMI”), 
and (ii) suburban residents who were middle and higher income 
suburban families impacted by recession-based underemployment or 
unemployment (the “non-traditional LMI”).99  The traditional LMI and 
the non-traditional LMI experience poverty differently, as detailed 
below through the exploration of their respective labor markets, 
employment opportunities, and social networks.  
The Great Recession compounded an already-distressed labor 
market.  The traditional LMI had already been experiencing a ten-year 
period of stunted job growth.100  Traditional LMI jobs are 
overwhelmingly low-skill and low-paid occupations.101  As compared to 
middle and higher incomes, the traditional LMI labor market suffered a 
 
96.  See, e.g., KNEEBONE & BERUBE, supra note 41, at 38, 42. 
97.  See also Aaron Wiener, The Post-Recession Homelessness Epidemic, NEXT CITY 
(Jul. 21, 2014), http://nextcity.org/features/view/the-post-recession-homelessness-epidemic, 
archived at http://perma.cc/PU3A-TFRH (citing National Employment Law Project report  
stating that there are 1 million fewer middle-income jobs than before the Great Recession). 
98.  See Edmiston, supra note 95, at 33, 35 (“LMI families are defined as those with 
income below 80 percent of an area’s median income, where the area of reference is either 
the metropolitan area in which a given family lives or, for nonmetropolitan areas, the state as 
a whole.”); see also, e.g., Allison Linn, Sprawling and Struggling: Poverty Hits America’s 
Suburbs, NBC NEWS (Mar. 22, 2013, 3:26 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/in-plain-
sight/sprawling-struggling-poverty-hits-americas-suburbs-v17404578, archived at http://perma.
cc/EY8B-FWMT. 
99.  See KNEEBONE & BERUBE, supra note 41, at 1–10; Edmiston, supra note 95, at 33. 
Factors contributing to the migration of low-income residents from the central cities to the 
suburbs include affordable housing advocacy, less expensive rental housing as a result of the 
glut in housing markets that blocked investors from being able to sell newly built homes, the 
availability of subprime mortgages, and the “return to downtown/the city” movement that is 
pricing low-income residents out of their homes.  See, e.g., id. at 48–54; Theresa Everline, 
Surviving Suburbia, 27 NEXT AM. CITY 32, 35 (2010). 
100.  See Edmiston, supra note 95, at 39–40. 
101.  Id. 
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steeper decline in employment during the recession.102  Moreover, 
because the Great Recession relentlessly assaulted practically all job 
categories, to the extent any traditional LMI positions become available, 
they are filled by unemployed but overqualified middle and higher 
income workers.103  Thus, even though much of the country is 
experiencing at least some sort of anemic economic recovery, practically 
speaking, the traditional LMI do not know that the Great Recession has 
ended. 
Unlike the traditional LMI, the majority of the non-traditional LMI 
joined the LMI ranks after the recession officially ended.104  That labor 
market also suffered significant losses during the recession.105  Once 
unemployed, these workers typically first exhausted their personal 
savings, 401(k) savings, credit, and other assets before seeking public 
assistance.106  The fact that the non-traditional LMI are more likely to 
fill any new job openings over a traditional LMI candidate provides 
little relief because these jobs pay lower wages than what successful 
candidates used to bring home and do not offer health benefits.107  These 
facts, compounded by depleted personal savings, significantly reduce 
any opportunities for the non-traditional LMI to regain their former 
wealth and ascend out of LMI status—in short, shrinking the middle 
class.   
Authors Kneebone and Berube argue that the experience of 
suburban poverty is different from that of urban poverty, and that the 
non-traditional LMI experience poverty differently from the traditional 
LMI.108  Regardless of their shared status as suburban residents, both 
the traditional LMI and the non-traditional LMI have challenges 
navigating poverty in the suburbs because suburban localities are ill-
equipped to fund and participate in poverty alleviation and other social 
service programs.  The staggering loss of financial aid from state 
governments coupled with an increase in poorer residents has severely 
strained the public service budgets of suburban local governments—
particularly because these entities were not designed to provide a high 
 
102.  Id. at 40. 
103.  See id. at 41.   
104.  Id. at 52. 
105.  Id. at 37. 
106.  Id. at 52. 
107.  See id. at 43. 
108.  See KNEEBONE & BERUBE, supra note 41, at 31–36. 
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volume of social services in the first place.109  Four particularly poignant 
examples of these limitations are public transportation, public 
assistance, charitable relief, and social networks.   
The suburbs are notoriously known for their lack of efficient public 
transportation.110  For the traditional LMI, this limitation makes cars a 
necessity for traveling to work.  However, given their limited financial 
resources, the traditional LMI are forced to use older model cars that 
come with the related maintenance issues—which means that even the 
slightest car repair could cause a major financial disruption.111  A second 
limitation is the lack of suburban infrastructure to accommodate rising 
demands for public assistance, such as food stamps.112  Likewise, because 
of the historical focus on poverty in urban areas, traditional sources of 
charitable relief are available, if at all, in extremely limited quantities.113  
Those programs that do operate in suburban areas are struggling to 
serve an exponentially larger need with significantly reduced dollars.114   
The limited suburban infrastructure for social services yields a set of 
distinct but equally unpleasant outcomes for both the traditional and 
non-traditional LMI that are directly impacted by the strength of their 
social networks.  Caring for one’s child can be grounds for termination, 
and a move across town can destroy all existing social networks that 
might be able to provide relief to alleviate any of the other scenarios.115  
In contrast to the social networks used by the traditional LMI to 
navigate their circumstances,116 suburban poverty can be an isolating 
 
109.  See Everline, supra note 99, at 34–37. 
110.  See KNEEBONE & BERUBE, supra note 41, at 60–62. 
111.  Id. at 60.  
112.  Id. at 62–66, 91; see also Mike Maciag, Food Stamp Enrollment Still Climbing in 
Many States, GOVERNING (July 30, 2013), http://www.governing.com/blogs/by-the-numbers/f
ood-stamp-snap-enrollment-rates-climb-in-states.html, archived at http://perma.cc/L7FL-
HPEN (“The number of Americans relying on federal assistance to put food on the table 
ballooned to record levels during the recession—more than doubling from just 10 years 
ago.”). 
113.  See KNEEBONE & BERUBE, supra note 41, at 62–66, 91–95.  As we consider new 
approaches to poverty alleviation in all communities, it is important to track the impact that 
the racialization of poverty has had on both individual and institutional thinking.  Charitable 
foundations need to re-examine their funding patterns to ensure that they are meeting the 
most urgent need and not falling victim to past patterns based on historical perceptions of 
poverty.  See, e.g., id.  
114.  Id. at 93–94.  
115.  See FULLILOVE, supra note 57, at 229. 
116.  See id.  
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experience for non-traditional LMI because of their unfamiliarity with 
its challenges.   
The recovery period for all LMI families (both traditional and non-
traditional) is the slowest among the economic recoveries occurring 
across the country—further cementing regional inequities.117  These 
challenges are occurring throughout our metropolitan regions without 
any comprehensive state or local government response designed to meet 
metropolitan regional needs.118  This is because, as explained in the 
following section, regional governance in both theory and application 
has failed to engage regional inequities.   
C. Governance Failings Perpetuate Regional Inequities  
As the realm of both the urban and suburban, metropolitan regions 
have long been the subject of academic conversations concerning 
regional governance.119  The expansion of suburban poverty combined 
with ongoing urban poverty brings new relevance and a sense of 
timeliness to the regional governance conversation, which is centered on 
the question of whether metropolitan regions are better managed 
though the individualized efforts of local governments within a given 
metropolitan region or by a voluntary cooperative approach shared 
among local governments within the same metropolitan region.120  The 
former approach is called localism, the latter called regionalism.121   
Entrenched as the predominant governing philosophy in America 
since the incorporation of the first suburbs, localism defines local 
government law and practice.122  Localism describes the autonomous 
operation of local governments independently from and irrespective of 
each other.123  Regionalism, in contrast, promotes the formation of 
formal government entities to manage metropolitan regional 
development and to guide fiscal relationships between localities.124  With 
very few exceptions, regionalism has always been more idea than 
implementable plan.125  This malleability has led scholars and 
 
117.  See Edmiston, supra note 95, at 38. 
118.  KNEEBONE & BERUBE, supra note 41, at 91. 
119.  See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Localism and Regionalism, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (2000). 
120.  See id. at 1.  
121.  Id.  
122.  See Parlow, supra note 21, at 53–55. 
123.  Id. at 53. 
124.  See id. at 62–63. 
125.  See id. at 62, 71–77. 
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practitioners from various disciplines to craft a range of regional 
governance proposals.126  As notions of regionalism evolved, a new 
branch of regionalism developed, appropriately called new regionalism.  
Unlike old regionalism, new regionalism seeks to identify new methods 
for cooperative land use planning between local governments while 
advocating for measures to eliminate the causes of regional inequities 
and encourage more efficient fiscal cooperation between local 
governments in the same metropolitan region.127  As demonstrated 
below, however, as a movement, new regionalism is stunted because it 
exists as a set of ideals without a framework for effectuating those 
ideals.   
There is a deep wealth of well-developed scholarship detailing local 
government law and regional governance theories;128 this Article uses 
the most salient of those points to advance the new regionalism 
conversation.  What follows next are descriptions of the theoretical 
underpinnings of each of the governance philosophies—localism,129 
regionalism,130 and new regionalism131—accompanied by critiques that 
demonstrate how each philosophy contributes to regional inequity and 
falls far short of meeting the needs of all regional constituents. 
1. The Dimensions of Localism 
On its face, localism is a seemingly neutral “descriptive and 
normative [governance] theory based on a preference for a system of 
decentralized, independent local governments and local control.”132  
Creations of their states, local governments “are subject to control by 
both their states and local constituents”133 and operate in a range of 
forms, including cities, counties, townships, and parishes.134  Our 50 
states are home to approximately 90,000 local governments with varying 
 
126.  See infra Part II.C.2–3.   
127.  Orfield, supra note 24, at 92; see also infra Part II.C.3 (discussing limitations of 
current attempts to regional fiscal cooperation). 
128.  See, e.g., Michelle Wilde Anderson, Mapped Out of Local Democracy, 62 STAN. L. 
REV. 931 (2010); Briffault, supra note 119; Gerald Frug, Against Centralization, 48 BUFF. L. 
REV. 31 (2000).  
129.  See infra Part II.C.1.   
130.  See infra Part II.C.2. 
131.  See infra Part II.C.3.   
132.  Parlow, supra note 21, at 53. 
133.  See RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 8 (6th ed. 2004). 
134.  See id. at 8–10. 
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levels of authority.135  Each of these units is created, authorized, and 
expected to act in isolation from its neighboring localities.136  Localists 
assert that the decentralized proliferation of our local governments 
encourages (i) freedom of consumer choice, (ii) government efficiency 
and innovation, and (iii) the preservation of the democratic process.137  
As explained below, however, this “fragmented” approach to governing 
metropolitan regions is not neutral but actually works counter to 
regional equity.138  
Arguments supporting localism’s efficiency fall into two categories: 
freedom of consumer choice and government efficiency.139  The notion 
of freedom of consumer choice is one of the earliest articulations of 
support for localism and is credited to the work of Professor Charles 
Tiebout.140  Professor Tiebout asserted that local government 
fragmentation is ideal for “consumer-voters” who can choose in which 
localities to live based on an assortment of available public services, tax 
rates, and regulations.141  Accordingly, the desire to recruit affluent 
residents and the constant threat of resident exodus keeps localities 
competitive and operating at optimal levels of effectiveness because 
unhappy residents can (in theory) always move to another locality.142  
Thus, localism serves as a constant “check” on the efficiency of local 
government activities.143 
The argument for government efficiency asserts that local 
government operations are superior to those of the federal and state 
 
135.  PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, THE LOCAL SQUEEZE: FALLING REVENUES AND 
GROWING DEMAND FOR SERVICES CHALLENGE CITIES, COUNTIES, AND SCHOOL 
DISTRICTS 5 (2012).  As these numbers suggest, local governments substantially affect the 
daily lives of their residents while also being significant economic and political actors at state 
and federal levels of government.  Advocacy organizations such as the National League of 
Cities and the United Conference of Mayors provide information about the potential social 
and economic impact of cities.  See About NLC, NAT’L LEAGUE CITIES, http://www.nlc.org/a
bout-nlc (last visited Dec. 31, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/XBP6-64Q4; Organization 
Overview, U.S. CONF. MAYORS, http://usmayors.org/about/overview.asp (last visited Dec. 31, 
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/7WJT-NXCD. 
136.  See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 135, at 5.  
137.  Briffault, supra note 119, at 15–17; Parlow, supra note 21, at 55–58.   
138.  See infra notes 153–60 and accompanying text. 
139.  See Briffault, supra note 119, at 15.  
140.  Id. (explaining Tiebout’s model in Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local 
Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956)). 
141.  Briffault, supra note 119, at 15 (quoting Tiebout, supra note 140, at 417). 
142.  See id. at 15–16.   
143.  Id. at 16; Tiebout, supra note 140, at 422. 
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governments.144  This superiority stems from the comparatively smaller 
size of local governments and their accessibility to residents.  
Specifically, the argument asserts that local governments are better 
suited to make localized policy decisions that can be specifically tailored 
to local preferences and are not overly inclusive of large numbers of 
unaffected or contrary interests.145  Additionally, because local 
government operations are, by definition, smaller than those at the 
federal and state levels, local governments are smaller bureaucracies 
that are, in theory, much easier for residents to navigate—thus keeping 
residents from exiting.   
In addition to government efficiency, local governments are 
routinely promoted as being more innovative than their state and 
federal counterparts.146  The argument asserts that local governments 
are more capable of fostering innovation with respect to policy-making, 
small business support and development, and the creative industries 
because their smaller size, comparatively speaking, makes it easier for 
the general public to navigate.147 
Lastly, the value of preserving the democratic process is framed in 
the language of increased public participation and civic engagement by 
local voters.  Supporters of localism assert that it provides residents with 
enhanced opportunities for public discourse and localized decision 
making because voters are voting on decisions that impact their day-to-
day lives.148  Similar to the arguments about government efficiency, the 
smaller size of a local government is thought to enhance the daily lives 
of its residents.149   
While the attributes of localism discussed above may explain its 
endurance, these attributes also coalesce to foster an enduring 
exclusivity with respect to which metropolitan residents receive their 
benefit.  In other words, as outlined below, localism does not promote 
 
144.  See Briffault, supra note 119, at 15. 
145.  See id. 
146.  See, e.g., Parlow, supra note 21, at 53. 
147.  See id. at 55–56 (providing health care, gay marriage, domestic partner benefits, 
climate change, immigration, minimum wage, and medical marijuana examples); Neil 
Westergaard, Denver Rises in Small Business Rankings, DENVER BUS. J. (Feb. 7, 2013, 2:50 
PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/denver/blog/broadway_17th/2013/02/Denver-rises-in-small-
business-rankings.html?s=print (last updated Feb. 8, 2013, 10:14 AM), archived at http://perm
a.cc/46AJ-S7TB. 
148.  But see Bill Keller, Op-Ed, States Gone Wild, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2013, at A23 
(noting who actually votes in local elections). 
149.  See, e.g., Parlow, supra note 21, at 55. 
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regional equity but in fact really only works for middle- and upper-class 
localities—the “favored quarter.”150  Favored quarter is the term used to 
describe those suburban communities that represent only a quarter of a 
regional population but experience the greatest amount of economic 
prosperity due to imbalances such as being able to use local control to 
avoid taking on regional social service burdens.151  A favored quarter is a 
regional space that meets the following three conditions:  
(1) it captures the largest or a disproportionate share of public 
infrastructure investments in the region; (2) it has the region’s 
largest tax base and is the area of highest job growth; and (3) it 
retains local powers, which it uses in a manner that closes its 
housing markets to non-affluent regional workers, thus becoming 
“both socially and politically isolated from regional 
responsibilities.”152 
This systematic regional imbalance is what localism protects and 
preserves.   
At the most fundamental level, local governments are service 
providers tasked with providing traditional public services, such as 
police and fire departments, which are essential to residential quality of 
life.  Localism has historically served both its affluent and middle-class 
constituents well by providing these services in the form of funding good 
schools, obtaining federal and state funding for public infrastructure, 
recruiting commercial retail development, and offering sizeable lots for 
single-family housing while restricting the construction of multi-family 
housing.153  Because the suburbs were designed to “create an exclusive 
quality of life for the emergent middle-class,”154 until now, localism has 
historically excelled at protecting its homogenous and affluent 
constituent communities from socioeconomic diversity.155  By its very 
definition, localism cannot simultaneously provide the same quality of 
benefits to all localities, which means that, for poor and working-class 
localities and the new suburban poor, localism does more harm than 
 
150.  See Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored 
Quarter: Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 1987 (2000). 
151.  See id. at 1987–88.   
152.  Id. at 2004 (quoting MYRON ORFIELD, METRO. AREA RESEARCH CORP., 
SEATTLE METROPOLITICS: A REGIONAL AGENDA FOR COMMUNITY AND STABILITY IN 
THE PUGET SOUND REGION 1–2 (1999)).   
153.  See Parlow, supra note 21, at 60. 
154.  Troutt, supra note 68, at 1146 (emphasis omitted).   
155.  See id. at 1145. 
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good, to the detriment of the metropolitan region.156  Theoretically, 
localism should provide the same opportunities for efficiency, 
innovation, and the preservation of the democratic process for all 
localities in a metropolitan region.  The quality of these opportunities 
for poor and working-class localities, however, is not the same as what is 
available to middle-class and affluent localities—cementing regional 
inequities.157  For example, all public service delivery is not created 
equal, and inner-ring suburban localities are not equipped to provide 
the public social services to their increasingly poor residents.158  This is 
because, regardless of today’s post-recession reality, suburban 
infrastructures were designed to “sustain an exclusive quality of life”159 
and, intentionally, not to provide public social services.160  The Great 
Recession certainly did not create poor and working-class suburbs; 
localism, however, does not serve these localities well.   
Localism’s dominance in local government law, however, is firmly 
grounded in the history of suburban development.  As suburban 
localities multiplied across the American landscape, they did so offering 
escape from urban life as well as the power to exclude any evidence of 
it.161 
So we must ask ourselves, now that the geography of poverty has 
changed, is localism a defensible approach for any community, even 
those it formerly served or continues to serve well?  This Article 
answers that question in the negative; future scholarship, previewed in 
Part IV, will detail how regional interest convergence can demonstrate 
to localists where their own self-interests are harmed by localism and 
where their interests align with regionalists’.   
2. The First Generation of Regionalism (Old Regionalism)  
The first generation of regionalism, “old regionalism,” is a response 
to localism’s system of fragmentation.  Regionalism offers a much more 
comprehensive scope to metropolitan development.  As metropolitan 
 
156.  See id. at 1145–46. 
157.  See, e.g., Shelley Ross Saxer, Local Autonomy or Regionalism?: Sharing the 
Benefits and Burdens of Suburban Commercial Development, 30 IND. L. REV. 659 (1997). 
158.  KNEEBONE & BERUBE, supra note 41, at 62–66. 
159.  See Troutt, supra note 68, at 1146 (emphasis omitted).  See supra notes 153–55 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of local government officials’ perceptions that local, state, 
and federal government have shared responsibility for providing community services.   
160.  See Troutt, supra note 68, at 1146.   
161.  See id. 
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regions grew in scope, regionalism called for the creation of formal 
metropolitan government institutions to manage this growth in 
coordination with the localities in the region. 162  Supporters argued that 
formal metropolitan governments could lead to more efficient land use 
planning and development and more comprehensive service delivery 
within regions.163  Despite federal studies164 and academic support165 
expounding on the benefits of regionalism, the metropolitan 
government movement very rarely materialized in practice in the 
United States.166 
Regionalism’s explicit concern is the improvement of government 
efficiency, initially though the creation of new formal regional 
government structures.167  Regionalism began as a movement advocating 
for the creation of formal government structures to manage 
development patterns and promote regional equity.168  The metropolitan 
government movement, however, transformed over time as suburban 
units of government began to populate the space surrounding central 
cities.  Instead of advocating for formal regional governments, the 
movement began to argue for regional governance.169  “Government” 
and “governance” are not synonymous terms.  A regional government is 
a formal legal structure formed by a state legislature to exercise 
authority over a particular subject matter,170 whereas regional 
governance refers to voluntary informal cooperative arrangements and 
contracting practices utilized by local governments to jointly and 
cooperatively manage certain activities within a region.171  There are 
only a handful of formal regional government structures in operation in 
 
162.  See STEPHENS & WIKSTROM, supra note 46, at vi.  The regional government 
movement began in earnest during the first half of the twentieth century.  See id. 
163.  Id. 
164.  See, e.g., THE COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, REPORT TO THE 
PRESIDENT FOR TRANSMITTAL TO THE CONGRESS (1955).  
165.  See Symposium, Metropolitan Regionalism: Developing Governmental Concepts, 
105 U. PA. L. REV. 439 (1957). 
166.  See infra note 172 and accompanying text regarding formal regional entities in 
Minnesota and Portland, Oregon. 
167.  See STEPHENS & WIKSTROM, supra note 46, at 24–27.  
168.  See Parlow, supra note 21, at 63–64. 
169.  See Gerald E. Frug, Beyond Regional Government, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1763, 1787, 
1831 (2002). 
170.  See STEPHENS & WIKSTROM, supra note 46, at vi.  
171.  See Frug, supra note 169, at 1787; Parlow, supra note 21, at 62–63.  
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this country.172  Regionalism advocates now seek “rules and 
arrangements that permit, encourage, or require regional approaches to 
issues of growth, quality of life, and inequality but that do not destroy 
local autonomy.”173  The primary arguments in support of regionalism174 
are  government efficiency, economic interdependence between central 
cities and suburbs, fair share contributions of tax revenue, and the 
establishment of a regional economy through regional economic 
development.175   
The argument that regionalism is the more efficient governance 
philosophy stems from the interdependent relationship between central 
cities and suburbs.  The ever-present disparities between central cities 
and suburbs should not suggest that these entities exist in complete 
independence of each other.  For example, suburban residents still work 
in central cities, and many suburban communities still rely on central-
city infrastructures for the provision of certain public services.176  
Moreover, domestically, business decisions and strategic planning are 
centered on regional analysis.177 
 
172.  Portland, Oregon, and the Twin Cities in Minnesota are the two most stable and 
lasting attempts at regional government.  See Frug, supra note 169, at 1777; see also, e.g., What 
is Metro, OREGON METRO, http://www.oregonmetro.gov/regional-leadership/what-metro 
(last visited Jan. 1, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/J3GL-CC5G; Who We Are, 
METROPOLITAN COUNCIL, http://www.metrocouncil.org/About-Us/The-Council-Who-We-
Are.aspx (last visited Jan. 1, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/GDN5-CBHT.  Portland’s 
Metro is the country’s first directly elected regional government, and it manages a range of 
issues including transportation and boundaries between urban and rural land.  What is Metro, 
supra.  The Twin Cities Metropolitan Council manages regional economic development 
planning, transportation, and housing policy.  Who We Are, supra.  Some scholars have 
speculated that an underlying reason for the implementation and tenure of these entities is 
the fact that they are centered in fairly homogenous populations as compared to other regions 
in the country.  See, e.g., Parlow, supra note 21, at 74–75.  While this Article does not 
advocate for the formation of similar entities, it does advocate for similar equitable outcomes 
in other metropolitan regions.  As such, the country’s changing demographics bring a new 
avenue of study to these entities.       
173.  Richard Briffault, Beyond City and Suburb: Thinking Regionally, 116 YALE L.J. 
POCKET PART 203 (2006), http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/beyond-city-and-suburb-thinking-
regionally. 
174.  According to Professor Richard Briffault, the three core components of the 
modern argument for regionalism are (i) the region is a “real economic, social, and ecological 
unit”; (ii) there is a need for comprehensive regional policies and planning; and (iii) there is a 
need for region-level mechanisms capable of formulating and executing regional-wide 
perspectives.  See Briffault, supra note 119, at 3–6. 
175.  See, e.g., id. at 15–17. 
176.  See infra notes 187–92 and accompanying text.  
177. See AMY B. DEAN & DAVID B. REYNOLDS, A NEW NEW DEAL: HOW REGIONAL 
ACTIVISM WILL RESHAPE THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 21–27 (2009). 
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In addition, several studies have established correlations between 
central-city income growth and suburban income growth and the 
positive impact of such growth on a region’s overall economy.178  The 
notion of regional economies has long been on the radar of economic 
development professionals,179 with a particular focus on the economic 
impact of regional clusters.180  The economic impact of a regional cluster 
is under continuous study but not in doubt.181  Domestic business 
decisions and strategic planning are centered on regional analysis.182  A 
relocating or expanding business, for example, will look to the region to 
determine if there is an existing industry cluster that would complement 
or compete with its goods and services.  In addition, that same business 
would assess the region’s transportation infrastructure, the quality of the 
available workforce, and the availability of housing for its existing 
workforce.  The new regional economy has been described as a 
“‘network economy’ in which access to many different forms of 
networks is critical.  These networks may revolve around labor pools, 
 
178.  See Briffault, supra note 119, at 13 (citing LARRY C. LEDEBUR & WILLIAM R. 
BARNES, ALL IN IT TOGETHER: CITIES, SUBURBS AND LOCAL ECONOMIC REGIONS 1 
(1993)). 
179.  See id. at 26–28. 
180.  A regional cluster exists where the economy is based on multiple complimentary 
industries that provide a diverse range of jobs.  See Mercedes Delgado, Michael E. Porter & 
Scott Stern, Clusters, Convergence, and Economic Performance 2–3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 18250, 2012); see also Joel Kotkin, Greetings from 
Recoveryland, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 15, 2010, at 30, 31 (reporting that Raleigh-Durham, among a 
few other areas, is a fast-growing location for Silicon Valley-type activity); Kit Eaton, The 
Silicon Valleys of the World: The European Edition, FAST CO. (July 24, 2012, 1:35 AM) 
http://www.fastcompany.com/1843422/silicon-valleys-world-european-edition, archived at http
://perma.cc/8QLD-MABV (listing Dublin, Berlin, and the Silicon Corridor, Silicon Fen, and 
Silicon Roundabout in Great Britain as European versions of the United States’ Silicon 
Valley). 
181.  Regional economies based on a singular industry have suffered.  “Rust Belt” is the 
phrase used to describe post-industrial cities who have suffered from massive declines in 
industry, jobs, and population, although there is some recent anecdotal information to suggest 
that some of these cities may be experiencing comebacks.  See, e.g., Jonathan Oosting, 
Brookings: Metro Detroit Economy on ‘Road to Full Recovery’ After Surviving ‘Great 
Recession,’ MICH. LIVE (Dec. 1, 2010, 10:53 AM), http://www.mlive.com/news/detroit/index.ss
f/2010/12/brookings_metro_detroit_econom.html (last updated Dec. 1, 2010, 12:29 PM), 
archived at http://perma.cc/D36G-RFC2 (reporting that Detroit has entered a recovery period 
since the 2008 recession); Will Doig, Rust Belt Chic: Declining Midwest Cities Make a 
Comeback, SALON (May 12, 2012, 11:00 AM), http://www.salon.com/2012/05/12/rust_belt_chi
c_declining_midwest_cities_make_a_comeback/, archived at http://perma.cc/KQ2Y-JT36. 
182.  See DEAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 177 at 21–27.  
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finance, retail, services, ideas, or other areas of expertise.”183  Studies 
have also found an interdependent relationship between the economic 
health of a region’s citizens and the region’s ability to compete 
successfully in the global marketplace.184  Thus,185 regions are domestic 
economic actors with the potential to participate in global markets.186  
Finally, in addition to the above arguments, there are very practical 
reasons for regionalism’s appeal.  Metropolitan residents lead regional 
lives.187  Residents’ daily activities (including work, shopping, and 
entertainment) may involve trips to numerous localities within a region 
in any given day.188   
Regionalists argue that the independent actions of multiple localities 
within a region are incapable of comprehensively addressing regional 
issues.189  Because localities plan in isolation from each other, 
regionalists argue that this status quo approach, fragmentation, is 
economically inefficient and inequitable.190  As independent units with 
their own tax bases, localities compete against each other for new 
affluent and middle-class residents who will grow their respective tax 
bases by deploying a host of fiscal and land use products such as zoning, 
eminent domain, and tax incentive programs.191  These incentives, 
however, further intensify regional inequities.192   
Despite its more comprehensive approach, regionalism still falls 
short of promoting regional equity.  As explained below, the majority of 
regional activities performed by local governments are governed by 
 
183.  See Janice C. Griffith, Regional Governance Reconsidered, 21 J.L. & POL. 505, 508 
(2005).   
184.  See PASTOR ET AL., supra note 31, at 35–36.  But see Briffault, supra note 119, at 
13–14 (explaining that the argument that regions compete in the global marketplace is 
controversial). 
185.  The idea of a regional role in the global economy is more aspirational than the 
domestic analog.  Social scientists, economists in particular, predict a role for regions as global 
economic actors but acknowledge that the capacity is not there yet except in a handful of 
regions such as Silicon Valley in northern California.  See Kotkin, supra note 180, at 32; 
Michael S. Malone, Why Silicon Valley Will Continue to Rule the Tech Economy (Aug. 22, 
2014, 6:51 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/michael-malone-why-silicon-valley-will-continue-
to-rule-the-tech-economy-1408747795, archived at http://perma.cc/8HV7-YTA9.    
186.  See Griffith, supra note 183, at 510. 
187.  See Briffault, supra note 173. 
188.  See, e.g., id.  
189.  See id.  
190.  See Griffith, supra note 183, at 509; see also Briffault, supra note 173. 
191.  See Briffault, supra note 173. 
192.  Id. 
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informal, voluntary arrangements.193  The two most frequently employed 
mechanisms of regional governance are intergovernmental cooperative 
agreements194 and special purpose districts.195  The widespread use of 
these mechanisms is not suited for ameliorating regional inequities, 
however, and the flawed design and implementation of these 
mechanisms actually contribute to regional inequality.196 
State laws generally permit municipalities and local governments to 
contract with each other through cooperative agreements for shared 
services and the collection and distribution of taxes.197  These regional 
service-sharing agreements typically govern costs and use for services 
such as police and fire departments, public transportation, waste 
treatment, airports, sports arenas, and convention centers.198  While it is 
quite common practice for localities to voluntarily enter into these 
agreements for the mutual benefit of their respective citizens, these are 
not comprehensive schemes of regional governance.199  First, the scope 
of these agreements is typically too narrowly defined or otherwise too 
limited to make any impact on regional inequities.200  For example, 
scopes of service are limited to discrete topics such as water, policing, or 
waste removal, whereas, in contrast, regional governance agreements 
rarely govern more comprehensive equity issues such as affordable 
housing efforts.201  Second, because these agreements are voluntary, they 
lack any stringent mechanisms for oversight or accountability.202  The 
 
193.  See infra notes 197–204 and accompanying text. 
194.  See Laurie Reynolds, Intergovernmental Cooperation, Metropolitan Equity, and the 
New Regionalism, 78 WASH. L. REV. 93, 119–32 (2003) [hereinafter Reynolds, 
Intergovernmental Cooperation]. 
195.  See Laurie Reynolds, Local Governments and Regional Governance, 39 URB. LAW. 
483, 498 (2007) [hereinafter Reynolds, Local Governments]. 
196.  See Reynolds, Intergovernmental Cooperation, supra note 194, at 123.  
197.  See Reynolds, Local Governments, supra note 195, at 496.   
198.  See Cashin, supra note 150, at 2030.   
199.  See id. at 2028–30.   
200.  See Reynolds, Intergovernmental Cooperation, supra note 194, at 120–32, 137. 
201.  See, e.g., McDougall, supra note 68, at 666–67 (discussing regional contribution 
agreements for affordable housing in New Jersey); Rachel Fox, The Selling Out of Mount 
Laurel: Regional Contribution Agreements in New Jersey’s Fair Housing Act, 16 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 535 (1988) (discussing regional contribution agreements for affordable housing in 
New Jersey); see also Alan Mallach, The Mount Laurel Doctrine and the Uncertainties of 
Social Policy in a Time of Retrenchment, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 849 (2011) (chronicling the 
series of Mount Laurel court decisions and the effects of their current application on 
affordable housing issues in New Jersey).  
202.  Reynolds, Intergovernmental Cooperation, supra note 194, at 127. 
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consequence of this is that there is no regional-level mechanism that 
monitors the execution or breach of these agreements.  Finally, these 
agreements are not designed to curb existing inequities between 
communities.203  In fact, scholars have argued that cooperative 
agreements actually exacerbate regional inequalities because only 
similarly situated municipalities are parties to the agreements.204  Thus, 
even if they contract with each other, less affluent localities do not 
benefit from this mechanism because of their limited resources.  
The creation of special purpose districts is a second approach to 
attempting some form of regional governance.  On average, each 
metropolitan region hosts 100 general purpose and special purpose local 
governments.205  As the name suggests, general purpose governments 
exercise authority over a large range of subject areas, such as land use, 
public safety, health, and transportation.206  In contrast, special purpose 
districts are delegated very limited scopes of authority207 and are formed 
typically to exercise narrowly defined powers over entities such as sports 
stadiums or transportation authorities.208  While special purpose 
governments are not uncommon, they are not inherently regional by 
design.209  In fact, some scholars have argued that special purpose 
entities are so widely used precisely because these entities yield no 
regional impact.210  Their narrow focus limits their authority to one 
issue, prevents any sort of coordinated effort with other entities, and 
makes them less susceptible to political entreaties.211  These entities deal 
with “things regionalism” rather than “people regionalism.”212  In other 
words, special purpose entities are not intended to address “lifestyle 
issues like housing, education, and social equity.”213  
 
203.  See id. at 116, 128. 
204.  Professor Laurie Reynolds argues that intergovernmental agreements have “non-
trivial” anti-regional effect.  Id. at 98. 
205.  STEPHENS & WIKSTROM, supra note 46, at vi. 
206.  BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 133, at 11. 
207.  Id. 
208.  See id. 
209.  See Reynolds, Local Governments, supra note 195, at 498.  
210.  See id.  
211.  See id. at 512 (discussing regional special districts).  
212.  Id. at 516–17 (quoting HENRY G. CISNEROS, REGIONALISM: THE NEW 
GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY 8–9 (1995)).   
213.  See id. at 516 (quoting Donald F. Norris, Prospects for Regional Governance Under 
the New Regionalism: Economic Imperatives Versus Political Impediments, 23 J. URB. AFF. 
557, 561 (2001). 
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Neither intergovernmental cooperative agreements nor special 
purpose districts are properly designed to alleviate regional inequities.  
After all of these decades, why has regionalism not been accepted as a 
viable option to localism?  Regionalism has failed to garner significant 
grassroots support214 because, in large part, it is an abstract concept.  
This is not just the result of a poorly executed marketing strategy, 
meaning it is not simply a matter of regionalists’ having a good product 
that they are not communicating properly about.  It is also about the 
product, or rather, the lack of an identifiable outcome and a focus 
instead on too many undefined outcomes.  Once regionalism moved 
away from advocating for formal regional government structures to 
advocating for informal regional governance structures, it unwittingly 
opened the door to countless mechanisms and proposals to effectuate 
informal regional governance.  It is hard to get grounded in or feel 
connected to a movement that has no solid tactical foundation.  
Numerous articles have been written to propose new forms of regional 
governance structures or legislation.215  Despite these proposals, 
however, regionalists have done a poor job of communicating with 
specificity what regionalism has to offer.  As a result, regionalism has 
experienced a series of theoretical and practical failures, which are 
structural and direct by-products of localism’s successes.  These include 
the failure to garner broad political support of, or at least key political 
figures capable of exercising political will in support of, regionalism; a 
persistent lack of momentum on the ground; the failure to deliver a solid 
framework for implementation; and the failure to communicate to 
localists the shared benefits of regionalism and where their self-interests 
are aligned.216  Regionalism’s informal attempt to address equity 
concerns with governance morphed into what is known as the new 
regionalism movement.   
3. New Regionalism’s Unfulfilled Promise  
Recognizing the limited appeal of formal regional government 
entities, regionalism advocates adjusted their strategic position to adopt 
a “new regionalism.”217  This new regionalism hearkens back to the 
underlying principles of the metropolitan government by seeking to 
 
214.  See Cashin, supra note 150, at 2037.   
215.  See, e.g., McDougall, supra note 68. 
216.  See Briffault, supra note 119, at 15–17; Parlow, supra note 21, at 70–77.  
217.  See Griffith, supra note 183, at 509–10.   
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serve the wider social and economic needs of all regional residents.218  It 
marries these equity principles to the use of informal and voluntary 
governance mechanisms that preserve local government autonomy.219  
This Article does not present a new type of governance school of 
thought.  Instead, recognizing the limitations in that area and 
acknowledging that many good ideas have been proposed that are yet to 
be tested, this Article proposes a strategy for revitalizing the dormant 
new regionalist movement to achieve regional equity.   
New regionalism is an interdisciplinary reform movement that 
promotes regional governance and regional equity.220  The movement 
materialized in planning literature in the 1990s as a response to the 
unchecked growth of regional inequities.221  Although a succinct 
definition of new regionalism has yet to evolve, “key elements” include 
a place-based focus on planning, crafting a “response to the problems of 
postmodern metropolitan regions,” a holistic approach to regional 
planning, retooling existing physical planning practices, and passionate 
advocacy.222  “New regionalists advocate measures to reduce growing 
inequality, discourage the detrimental fiscal competition between local 
governments within a metropolitan region, and remove fiscal barriers to 
cooperative land use planning.”223  The movement seeks to respond to 
the current tension in the regional governance conversation concerning 
the feasibility of and desire to achieve equitable delivery of local 
government services and cure other regional inequities while respecting 
local government autonomy.224  Instead of a formal metropolitan 
 
218.  See Cashin, supra note 150, at 2027.   
219.  See id. 
220.  See Stephen M. Wheeler, The New Regionalism: Key Characteristics of an 
Emerging Movement, 68 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 267, 267–74 (2002).   
221.  See id. at 267, 269. 
222.  See id. at 270–71 (title case removed); see also Reynolds, Intergovernmental 
Cooperation, supra note 194, at 113 (listing efficiency, economic interdependence, 
participatory democracy, and equity as the four criteria that underlie the new regionalist 
movement). 
223.  Orfield, supra note 24, at 92. 
224.  See Cashin, supra note 150, at 2028.  Despite the moniker, new regionalism is not 
an entirely new concept, and, notwithstanding its stated platforms, there is no universal 
description of the new regionalist movement.  Frug, supra note 169, at 1786–87; see also 
Wheeler, supra note 220, at 270.  “In fact, rather than a cohesive ideology with a well-
accepted policy agenda, New Regionalism refers more precisely to shared concerns and goals 
for metropolitan area equity.”  Reynolds, Intergovernmental Cooperation, supra note 194, at 
112.  “It is hard to pin down exactly what new regionalism is.”  Frug, supra note 169, at 
1786−87. 
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government, new regionalists advocate for a form of regional 
governance, created through cooperation and collaborative efforts, 
seeking to implement governance mechanisms that have regional impact 
as opposed to regional authority while advancing regional equity.225 
To a large extent, the new regionalism movement is suffering from 
the same inertia that doomed the metropolitan government movement 
discussed earlier.226  This is because much of the conversation concerns 
what goals new regionalism should achieve to the exclusion of how to 
achieve those goals227 and, to the extent such mechanisms exist, they are 
not structured in ways that promote regional equity.  It is too simple 
(but not inaccurate) to say that new regionalism has a branding 
problem.  New regionalists promote regional equity but not directly in 
the communities for which it is promoted.  A reform movement without 
a strategy is an academic concept, and new regionalism has largely 
remained an academic ideal instead of becoming a grassroots 
movement—which is a missed opportunity.  New regionalists hold 
fundamental the notion that all elements of a region—cities, suburbs, 
and green space—are connected and should not be treated in isolation 
from each other.228  The movement, however, has not articulated any 
strategies or crafted any political campaigns to achieve its loosely 
defined goals.229  It is missing an implementable strategic plan.  Regional 
interest convergence is such a strategy.   
Although each governance philosophy has strengths and 
weaknesses, this Article argues that a new regionalist governance 
philosophy offers the optimal governance theory for metropolitan 
regions because it offers a workable balance between governance 
interests.  The new regionalist movement has been missing a strategic 
framework to facilitate its actual implementation, and this Article 
presents regional interest convergence as such a framework.   
 
225.  See Cashin, supra note 150, at 2027–28.   
226.  See supra Part II.C.2.  
227.  But see Cashin, supra note 150, at 2036–41 (proposing grassroots coalition building 
and the smart growth movement as concrete examples for achieving new regionalism). 
228.  Griffith, supra note 183, at 509.   
229.  See Reynolds, Local Governments, supra note 195, at 490; see also Griffith, supra 
note 183, at 509–10. 
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III. TOWARDS A NEW STRATEGY FOR REGIONAL GOVERNANCE: 
INTEREST CONVERGENCE  
As explained, the new regionalist movement is missing a substantive 
implementation strategy.  As detailed in Parts III and IV, regional 
interest convergence can fill this gap.  What makes this possible is the 
reconceptualization of interest convergence as a transaction—an 
exchange for value between regional constituents.  This Article 
accomplishes that by introducing an interest convergence methodology 
for use as a strategic tool of reform and as a framework for problem 
solving.  To provide the appropriate context for the methodology, it is 
important to first review the evolution of the interest convergence 
theory in legal scholarship, particularly its uses as legal strategy.   
A. Interest Convergence Theory  
Professor Derrick Bell first articulated the interest convergence 
theory in a 1980 Harvard Law Review article.230  The article was a 
response to Professor Herbert Wechsler’s criticism of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education, the landmark public 
school desegregation case.231  Professor Wechsler critiqued the decision 
as lacking in neutral principles, meaning he believed that the Supreme 
Court did not reach its decision as an “exercise of reason” but as an 
exercise of its will by treating segregation in public schools as a matter 
of discrimination instead of freedom of association.232  Thus, while 
Professor Wechsler himself did not personally object to the outcome of 
the case, he accused the Court of mischaracterizing the issue to achieve 
the desired outcome.233  Professor Bell countered the idea that the case 
was wrongly decided by using the interest convergence theory as a lens 
to explain the decision.234  As Brown concerned the nation’s separate 
 
230.  Bell, supra note 27.  Professor Derrick Bell was a well-respected constitutional law 
scholar and pioneer of critical race theory scholarship.  The interest convergence theory is 
arguably one of Professor Bell’s most important legacies.  Not only is it a pillar of critical race 
theory scholarship, but it has also been applied in a host of other legal scholarship genres and 
as a way to elucidate unequal bargaining power and divergent interests.  See DERRICK BELL 
OFFICIAL SITE, http://professorderrickbell.com/tributes/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2014), archived 
at http://perma.cc/84V-G7SD.  
231.  Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also Bell, supra note 27 (discussing 
Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 
(1959)).  
232.  See Brown, 347 U.S. at 520. 
233.  Wechsler, supra note 231, at 32–34.  
234.  See Bell, supra note 27, at 524.  
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systems for educating black and white children, Bell identified the 
relevant interests in the case (and as representative of interests 
throughout the country) as those belonging to blacks and to white 
elites.235  Specifically, Professor Bell argued that the Court’s decision 
was the manifestation of the convergence of the interests of white elites 
and blacks.236  Professor Bell described the interests of blacks in Brown 
as wanting to achieve racial equality through desegregated schools, and 
the interests of white elites as being beyond the immorality of racial 
inequality237 and extending to reputational concerns about counteracting 
Communism domestically (particularly in the black community) and 
internationally, reassuring black Americans about the country’s 
progress towards racial equality, and removing segregation as a barrier 
to the industrialization of the South.238  He concluded that the Court 
reached its decision because the interest of blacks in achieving racial 
equality through desegregated schools did not conflict with those 
interests of white elites.239  In other words, the interests of blacks seeking 
racial equality through the desegregation of public schools converged 
with the very different interests of white elites who viewed the 
desegregation of America’s public schools as a means to the end of 
protecting the country’s international reputation on race matters, 
stemming Communism, and maintaining a sense of domestic calm.240   
Regional interest convergence is a reconceptualization of the 
interest convergence theory, a theory designed to explain the 
circumstances under which the interests of subordinated peoples are 
 
235.  See id. at 523–25. It is important to note that the “white” interests represented the 
interests of white elites, which adds a very interesting class dimension to the analysis.  Poor 
whites were outraged by the outcome of Brown.  See id. at 525–26; see also Derrick Bell, 
Diversity’s Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622 (2003) (applying the interest convergence 
theory to explain the Supreme Court’s decision in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), 
approving Michigan Law School’s affirmative action program in its admissions process).  See 
infra Part IV for a discussion of how regional interest convergence contemplates class. 
236.  See Bell, supra note 27, at 523–24. 
237.  Id. at 525.  In fact, Professor Bell argued that white interest in racial equality would 
not have been enough to motivate the decision.  Id.    
238.  Id. at 524–25.  Professor Bell notes that there were whites who recognized that 
segregation was inhibiting economic development.  See id.  
239.  Id. at 523.  “[T]his principle of ‘interest convergence’ provides: The interest of 
blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it converges with the 
interests of whites.”  Id. 
240.  See id. at 523–25. 
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advanced.241  Many scholars perceive the theory as a particularly 
pessimistic view of race relations in America because it asserts that the 
interests of a subordinated group will not advance until those interests 
align with the interests of the majority group and the alignment does not 
alter the majority’s status quo.242  Some might therefore question this 
Article’s reference to the interest convergence theory to promote 
regional equity, particularly because, unlike the interest convergence 
theory, this Article does not position the advancement of regional 
equity on the maintenance of any group’s status quo.  This Article 
instead takes the position that interest convergence has the potential to 
be a dynamic tool for identifying and aligning the myriad interests in 
metropolitan regions because it explicitly contemplates the positions of 
subordinated peoples, a necessary factor in any equity analysis.243  This 
Article reconceptualizes the interest convergence theory and highlights 
the theory’s unique suitability for navigating power dynamics in 
metropolitan regions by identifying and aligning interests across a 
metropolitan region to promote regional equity without regard for the 
maintenance of any regional constituents’ status quo.244 
B. Interest Convergence Methodology 
Several notable legal scholars have employed interest convergence 
theory to discuss a range of social inequities and cultural phenomena.245  
These scholars have broadened the application of the interest 
convergence theory by crafting derivative theories of convergence to 
analyze group dynamics and to advocate for reform.246  Similarly, this 
 
241.  See Justin Driver, Rethinking the Interest-Convergence Thesis, 105 NW. U. L. REV 
149, 150–51 (2011). 
242.  See Cashin, supra note 26, at 254–55.  See also infra notes 246–64 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of the optimistic frame of the transactional approach. 
243.  See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984). 
244.  This application of interest convergence in a transactional context diverges from 
Professor Bell’s original articulation of the theory.  See supra notes 230–40 and accompanying 
text. 
245.  See, e.g., Cashin, supra note 26.  
246.  See, e.g., infra notes 244–52 and accompanying text; see also Cashin, supra note 26; 
Michèle Alexandre, “Love Don’t Live Here Anymore”: Economic Incentives for a More 
Equitable Model of Urban Redevelopment, 35 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1 (2008) (exploring 
interest convergence between city officials and private developers to incorporate the interests 
of the “economically vulnerable” in redevelopment projects).  For a detailed list and analysis 
of articles exploring the interest convergence theory in legal scholarship, see Driver, supra 
note 241, at 152 nn.17–18 (critiquing Professor Bell’s interest convergence theory).  See also 
 
 2014] REGIONAL INTEREST CONVERGENCE 799 
Article also presents a new derivative theory of interest convergence.  
This Article, however, explores the interest convergence theory from a 
transactional perspective and proposes interest convergence as a 
strategy for reviving the new regionalist movement and advancing 
regional equity. 
Professor Cynthia Lee writes that interest convergence has 
applications as both an “explanation” and a “tool of strategy or 
prediction.”247  Interest convergence as “explanation” is demonstrated 
when legal scholars use the theory to explain specific judicial decisions, 
judicial trends, and legislative enactments.248  Professor Bell’s 
articulation of the theory to explain Brown is the archetype of this 
application.249  Interest convergence as a “tool of strategy and 
prediction” speaks to legal scholars’ deployment of the theory to 
advocate for reform in various subjects.250  For example, Professor Lee 
uses interest convergence theory as the foundation for her theory of 
cultural convergence, which offers a normative theory for predicting 
when cultural evidence will be successfully used by defendants in 
criminal trials.251  Cultural convergence is “the idea that the interests of 
minority and immigrant criminal defendants in obtaining leniency seem 
most likely to receive accommodation when there is a convergence 
between dominant majority cultural norms and the cultural norms relied 
upon by the immigrant or minority defendant.”252  According to 
Professor Lee, cultural convergence theory can be an explanation for 
 
Stephen M. Feldman, Do The Right Thing: Understanding the Interest-Convergence Thesis, 
106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 248 (2012) (critiquing Professor Driver’s critique). 
247.  Lee, supra note 28, at 925, 933.  For example, Professor Catherine Smith employs 
interest convergence theory as an organizing strategy to promote what she coined “outsider 
interest convergence.”  Catherine Smith, Unconscious Bias and “Outsider” Interest 
Convergence, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1077, 1080 (2008).  Professor Smith argues that subordinated 
groups should use interest convergence theory to build coalitions with each other as 
“outsiders” to the majority by identifying “what are perceived to be white middle class, 
heterosexual norms and the subordinated groups’ respective group’s failures to conform to 
those norms serve to marginalize each group and all groups in the coalition.”  Id. at 1089.  For 
Professor Smith, interest convergence theory is a tool that subordinated groups should use to 
find shared concerns and commonalities in order to strengthen their collective power and 
facilitate interactions with the majority.  See id. at 1089–90. 
248.  See Lee, supra note 28, at 925–32.   
249.  See Bell, supra note 27. 
250.  See Lee, supra note 28, at 933 (presenting four categories of legal scholarship that 
treat interest convergence theory as strategy or predictive of the success of that strategy: 
workplace reform, educational reform, political reform, and other reforms).   
251.  See id. at 914.  
252.  Id. at 913–14. 
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why some defendants may be more successful than others in defending 
their criminal cases.253  In other words, when immigrant and minority 
defendants are successful with the deployment of cultural evidence in 
their defense, it may be because they have cultural norms that are 
similar to or in alignment with the norms of our dominant culture.254  
This is an example of employing interest convergence theory as a tool 
for prediction.  Professor Lee’s approach highlights a quintessential 
point about the interest convergence theory—it is not an answer but a 
device by which to illuminate possible answers, explanations, strategies, 
and predictions.255   
The feasibility of the interest convergence theory as the explanation 
for the outcome in Brown is certainly subject to debate.  Professor Bell 
himself acknowledged that the white interests he identified in Brown 
might “seem insufficient proof of self-interest leverage” to explain 
Brown, given the importance of the decision, but that those interests, 
nonetheless, help assess the decision.256  Professor Bell’s analysis 
presents a set of criteria that can be normalized and replicated to 
promote interest convergence in other contexts, specifically, for the 
purposes of this Article, the new regionalist movement.257  This Article 
distills the interest convergence theory into its component elements to 
formalize an interest convergence methodology and applies interest 
convergence in the context of local government law from a transactional 
perspective.258  As such, regional interest convergence serves as a novel 
application of interest convergence from a transactional perspective in 
the local government context.   
Transactional law focuses on creating value for the various parties to 
a transaction.259  Interest convergence theory has overwhelmingly been 
 
253.  See id. 
254.  See id. 
255.  See id. at 939–58.  
256.  Bell, supra note 28, at 525.   
257.  See id. at 523–25. 
258.  Cf. Jonathan C. Augustine, The Interest Convergence of Education Reform and 
Economic Development: A Response to “The State of Our Unions,” 51 U. LOUISVILLE L. 
REV. 407 (2013) (writing about the convergence of economic interests to improve public 
education). 
259.  See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers:  Legal Skills and 
Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 244–56 (1984); Ronald J. Gilson, Lawyers as Transaction Cost 
Engineers (Working Paper No. 147, 1997), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=11418, 
archived at http://perma.cc/8PMZ-GP3M.   
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examined in a litigation- or rights-based context.260  This Article 
proposes that “interest convergence operating in a transactional context, 
facilitates sustainable alignments between distinct sets of interests and 
that these alignments are fluid and would be responsive to changes in 
interests over time.”261  While litigating rights-based controversies has 
undoubtedly secured fundamental rights for subordinated groups, that 
approach can produce a framework for myopic and narrow analyses of 
those interests.262  Transactional practice, in contrast, is a collaborative 
process.263  Instead of one party seeking value at the expense of another, 
all parties to the transaction typically expect some sort of exchange of 
value.264   
The methodology below presents Professor Bell’s analysis of the 
facts and outcome of Brown to identify the criteria for navigating an 
interest convergence question.265  The elements of the methodology are 
as follows: multiple constituent groups, one of whom is subordinated or 
represents a subordinated interest;266 distinct interests held by each 
constituent group; at least one method of convergence; and an actual 




260.  See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
261. Patience A. Crowder, Interest Convergence as Transaction?, 75 U. PITT. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 7) (on file with author). 
262.  See John O. Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire Music: Securing 
an Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2129, 2215–16 
(1992). 
263.  ALICIA ALVAREZ & PAUL R. TREMBLAY, INTRODUCTION TO TRANSACTIONAL 
LAWYERING PRACTICE 4 (2013). 
264.  Id. 
265.  See Bell, supra note 27, at 523–33. 
266.  See infra notes 276–78 and accompanying text for a discussion about whether, 
excluding Brown, subordination is a requirement for all interest convergence questions.  
267.  See Bell, supra note 27, at 523–33. 
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Table 1 




White Elites Blacks 
Multiple 
Interests 
Protect the United States’ 
international reputation 
concerning race relations; 
curtail the spread of 
Communism in the black 
community; and remove 
segregation as a barrier to 
industrialization in the 
South.






























268. The specific exclusion of the interests of low-income whites is a second form of 
subordination presented by Brown.  See id. at 525–26.   
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1. Multiple Constituent Groups 
An interest convergence transaction requires multiple constituent 
groups.  Professor Bell constructed the interest convergence theory 
around the interests of black and elite white Americans.269  He made it a 
point to explain that poor white Americans were vehemently opposed 
to public school integration,270 and their interests were not considered by 
the Court.271 
2. Multiple Interests  
An interest convergence transaction requires at least two distinct 
sets of interests.  According to Professor Bell, the interests of white 
elites centered on America’s international reputation for being a 
country of tolerance; foreclosing the spread of Communism, particularly 
in the black community; and removing the economic barriers to 
industrialization that were being structurally maintained by segregation 
in the south.272  The interests of blacks, in comparison, centered on 
achieving racial equality through the desegregation of public schools.273  
It is important to understand that the interests in an interest 
convergence transaction do not have to mirror each other or even be 
similar for a convergence to occur.  As explained further in Part IV, the 
interests must be capable of being aligned.  In Brown, the interests of 
blacks in desegregated schools as a function of “equality of individual 
opportunity”274 aligned with the interests of white elites to facilitate the 
Court’s decision to desegregate public schools.275 
3. Subordinated Party/Type of Subordination  
Interest convergence was designed to explain convergences of 
interest between multiple parties, where one party was subordinated in 
some respect to the other.276  Brown was decided at the beginning of the 
civil resistance campaigns of America’s Civil Rights Movement, a social 
movement dedicated to eradicating formal systems of race 
 
269.  Id. at 523. 
270.  Id. at 525. 
271.  See id. at 525–26. 
272.  Id. at 523–25.  
273.  Id. at 529.  
274.  WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE 
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 112 (2d ed. 2012).  
275.  See Bell, supra note 27, at 524–25. 
276.  See id. at 523.  
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discrimination in the United States and lessening the impact of informal 
discriminatory practices.277  Thus, blacks were the subordinated group in 
Brown and the type of subordination was racial discrimination, 
specifically with respect to segregation in public schools.278 
4. Medium for Convergence 
An interest convergence transaction requires a medium for 
convergence.279  In Brown, the Supreme Court was the method of 
convergence.  While the Court’s decision does not explicitly state that it 
considered each of the interests identified by Professor Bell, there is 
evidence that the parties raised these or similar issues in their respective 
briefs in addition to other forms of circumstantial evidence.280  
5. Resulting Convergence   
An interest convergence transaction has an outcome.281  In Brown, 
the Court’s decision to desegregate America’s public schools was the 
resultant interest convergence.282  Desegregation was formally outlawed, 
which met the interests of white elites in preserving America’s 
international reputation on race relations, appeasing blacks and 
stemming Communism in the black community, and opening access to 
quality public education in the South with the goal of industrializing the 
South.283  This outcome met the interests of both blacks and white elites 
without, as Professor Bell noted, altering the status quo of white elites.284 
Distilling the interest convergence theory down to its basic elements 
permits a reconceptualization of the theory’s import and application.  
This reconceptualization is appropriate because, to date, scholars have 
 
277.  See WILSON, supra note 274, at 112–14.  
278.  See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
279.  See Bell, supra note 27, at 528–29. 
280.  See Brief for Appellants, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (No. 1); see 
also Lee, supra note 28 at 922–24 (citing MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR RIGHTS: RACE 
AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 90–102 (2000) (discussing Mary Dudziak’s 
book Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy, in which Dudziak 
detailed archival records that substantiated Bell’s assertion that Brown was a Cold War 
reaction—validating his interest convergence theory)).    
281.  See Bell, supra note 27, at 523.  
282.  See id. at 524; see also Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.  
283.  See Bell, supra note 27, at 523–25. 
284.  This Article deviates from Professor Bell’s interest convergence theory on this 
point.  As explained in Part IV, regional interest convergence does not require the majority 
party’s status quo to remain unchanged to facilitate the convergence.  See infra notes 322–25 
and accompanying text.   
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explored interest convergence theory in litigation-based contexts.285  
This reconceptualization demonstrates that, on a most fundamental 
level, interest convergence can be a type of transaction between 
multiple parties (here, regional constituent groups) which creates a 
space for the implementation of regional interest convergence as a 
transaction for pursuing new regionalism in regional planning.   
IV. REGIONAL INTEREST CONVERGENCE: 
A NEW REGIONALISM REVIVAL  
As I have argued in other scholarship, interest convergence can 
serve as a transactional framework for bringing value to different 
constituent groups.286  In that vein, regional interest convergence is a 
transactional strategy that could reboot the new regionalism movement 
and revive it by activating new regionalism’s twin goals of equity and 
efficiency.287  Using the nomenclature of local government law, this 
section identifies regional constituents and their interests that are ripe 
for convergence; introduces the regional interest convergence 
methodology; and outlines mechanisms to effectuate regional interest 
convergence.  The vignettes below depict scenarios of two different 
types of metropolitan communities and demonstrate where the interests 
of these regional constituents can converge.   
A Tale of Two Communities 
Although it didn’t start that way, life in Townedge Park288 has been 
hard for generations.  Originating as a working class neighborhood in 
the late nineteenth century, today, it is known as the untouchable 
neighborhood—the “hard hood.”  A community surrounded by industry 
and where people without choice or options end up.  Depending on who 
you ask, it may be the poorest community in the city; it certainly is one 
of the poorest in the state.  It is the neighborhood of last resort, where 
no one moves to voluntarily but finds a way to call it home once they are 
there.  It is approximately 1,500 people surrounded by a Central City of 
almost 500,000.  It is a community where close to 90% of the housing is 
public or subsidized low-quality housing; where the median annual 
household income is $8,000; where the median rent is $174; where 82% 
 
285.  See, e.g., Lee, supra note 28, at 925–33.  
286.  See Crowder, supra note 261.  
287.  See Tyson, supra note 25, at 302. 
288.  Townedge Park is a hypothetical neighborhood in a central city.   
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of the population lives below the poverty level (compared to 22% of the 
surrounding city); where over 90% of the adult women in the 
community commute outside of it for work in a service industry; and 
where the overwhelming majority of residents are people of color and 
immigrants.  It is a poor inner-city community and its struggles have 
isolated it from other communities in the city. 
In comparison, since its formation as a suburb of Central City, day-
to-day life in Groveland is markedly different from the daily experiences 
in Townedge Park.289  This is despite the fact that the communities are 
less than fifteen miles apart.  It incorporated as a suburb in the 1940s to 
form part of the emerging metropolitan region and existed as an idyllic 
community for decades.  Over the years its population grew steadily but 
modestly to close to 85,000.  Its leadership worked to preserve a certain 
quality of life in Groveland by steadfastly focusing on promoting the 
construction of single-family homes and recruiting national commercial 
chains.  Within four years of the housing crisis and the Great Recession, 
one in every eighteen homes was foreclosed.  Today, it is a community 
of single-family homes, of two-car garages, and where the median 
household income used to be $89,000 and the unemployment rate sat at 
3%.  Today, unemployment is 9%.  The construction and manufacturing 
jobs that had historically sustained Groveland and similar suburbs 
across the nation disappeared.  Formerly an affluent community, 
Groveland now has struggles similar to those in Townedge Park. 
Not so long ago, the differences between these two communities 
could not be starker; today, however, they share striking commonalities 
that present profound opportunities for change in regional planning and 
poverty alleviation programs.   
The application of regional interest convergence to regional inequity 
is particularly appropriate because, as discussed in Part III, the origins 
of interest convergence theory lie in identifying mechanisms by which 
subordinated groups can advance their cause.290  The strategy is also 
relevant given the history of race and class discrimination in the 
evolution of our metropolitan regions.291  The growth and development 
of metropolitan regions cannot be fully understood nor can the 
persistent advancement of regional inequity be remedied without 
recognizing the intersection of race and class discrimination that 
 
289.  Groveland is a hypothetical suburb of a central city.   
290.  See supra notes 276–85 and accompanying text. 
291.  See supra Part II.A. 
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sustained the suburbs for decades.  Exclusive by design, the proliferation 
of the suburbs was fueled by racial and economic segregation that 
confined the majority of blacks to central cities to contend with a range 
of social ills, including concentrated poverty.292  This, unsurprisingly, led 
to a correlation between race and poverty that that persists today.293  
Efforts to alleviate poverty throughout metropolitan regions have to 
take this race and class dynamic into account to reach their optimum 
level of effectiveness.  Otherwise, systematic problems will go 
unaddressed.   
A. Regional Constituents  
Metropolitan regions house a diverse range of individual, 
community-based, and institutional residents, and, as such, are home to 
a diverse range of regional constituent groups, each with its own 
respective interests.  In the regional governance vernacular, there are 
two predominant, but unequally situated, regional constituent groups: 
regionalists and localists.294  These are not political parties.  These labels 
are shorthand for an approach that a regional constituent would support 
to protect its space and interests in the region.  Regionalists advocate for 
mechanisms of regional governance to conceive of, manage, and 
develop metropolitan areas as regional spaces.295  Localists champion 
the autonomy of independent local governments as the appropriate 
form of regional management.296  Scholarship on local government law 
and regional governance has not recognized areas for the convergence 
of interests between regionalists and localists.  This Article presents 
regional interest convergence as a framework that can facilitate that 
convergence by identifying and squaring the amorphous limits of new 
 
292.  There is an extensive literature about the well-documented patterns of 
discrimination that supported the exclusivity of the suburbs.  See generally MARY PATTILLO, 
BLACK ON THE BLOCK: THE POLITICS OF RACE AND CLASS IN THE CITY (2007); RUSK, 
supra note 38; ROBERT O. SELF, AMERICAN BABYLON: RACE AND THE STRUGGLE FOR 
POSTWAR OAKLAND (2003); RAY SUAREZ, THE OLD NEIGHBORHOOD: WHAT WE LOST IN 
THE GREAT SUBURBAN MIGRATION 1966–1999 (1999). 
293.  See, e.g., Ian Haney López, Is Paul Ryan Racist?, POLITICO (Mar. 14, 2014), http://
www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/03/is-paul-ryan-racist-104687_full.html?, archived at 
http://perma.cc/W2JF-2X8R (discussing politics and the racialization of inner-city poverty).  It 
is worth noting that the non-traditional members of the LMI population are typically not 
minorities and tend to have more education than the traditional LMI population.  Edmiston, 
supra note 95, at 53.   
294.  See Briffault, supra note 119, at 1. 
295.  See Parlow, supra note 21, at 52. 
296.  Id. at 53. 
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regionalism.297  As explained below, regional interest convergence 
makes these limits functionally effective through the identification of 
regional constituent groups and their interests and by providing a 
convergence mechanism for aligning those interests.298   
1. The Localists’ Autonomy Interest  
As previously explained, localism is currently the dominant 
governance construct in metropolitan regions.299  Succinctly stated, 
localism is “about the legal and political empowerment of local areas.”300  
Localists, therefore, seek to preserve and protect the current system of 
multiple “relatively small governments wielding power over such critical 
matters as local land use regulation, local taxation, and the financing of 
local public services.”301  As a system that celebrates the independence 
of localities, localism is supported by a range of individual and 
institutional actors.302  These individual and institutional actors are what 
I identify as the first of the two regional constituent groups identified in 
this Article: the localists.  The localists constituent group consists of 
suburban local government leaders, residents of affluent suburbs, 
business and industry entities,303 real estate developers,304 institutions of 
higher education, and, in many cases, central-city officials.305  The 
members of the localists constituency have varying reasons for their 
preference but are united in their ideology of decentralized power in 
regional spaces.306  The members of the localists constituent group 
 
297.  See supra notes 24–28 and accompanying text. 
298.  See infra notes 311–15 and accompanying text. 
299.  See Parlow, supra note 21, at 51. 
300.  Briffault, supra note 119, at 2. 
301.  Id. at 1.   
302.  See id. at 2. 
303.  See id.  While business and industry may have strategic regional plans to guide 
their growth and development, these entities interact with local governments on a variety of 
significant matters that include recruitment, relocation assistance, and tax incentives.  
304.  See JOHN MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 8.1 (Supp. 2014).  
305.  Despite the concerns of inner-city communities with equity, central-city leadership 
is included in the localist constituent group because many of these leaders typically view 
autonomy as the way to maintain the influence of the central city (or at least its internal 
power structure).  See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 119, at 28–29 (“Central city officials and 
residents who would benefit from some forms of regionalism, such as tax base sharing, might 
be leery of regional initiatives that seem to threaten the autonomy of their communities or 
weaken their political voices.”). 
306.  See Parlow, supra note 21, at 53.  The localists interest of autonomy has two distinct 
strands: autonomy and equity.  In other words, there are two subsets of localists—those who 
value autonomy for the sake of autonomy and those who value autonomy as a means for 
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typically occupy a privileged position in regional spaces—a position that 
has historically been well-maintained by localism.307  While the earliest 
arguments for localism were clothed in the language of “public choice” 
to preserve the localist values identified in Part II,308 today’s dominant 
justification is articulated as “autonomy”309—the autonomy to control 
land use, tax rates and the distribution of tax revenues, and the delivery 
of municipal services.310  Thus, for the purposes of the regional interest 
convergence methodology, the localists interest is autonomy.  “Choice” 
and “autonomy” are seemingly innocuous terms, but we know from the 
history of metropolitan regional development that they can be used as 
proxies for race and class discrimination.311  Because regional interest 
convergence requires the identification and alliance of interests, it has 
the potential to move beyond such pretexts and guard against 
discrimination.   
2. The Regionalists’ Equity Interests  
Regionalists “call for new regional processes, structures, or 
institutions that can identify regional problems, formulate regional 
solutions, implement those solutions, and coordinate regional actions 
over a wide range of policy domains.”312  The second group of regional 
constituents I have identified is the regionalists.  The regionalists 
 
achieving regional equity.  I call these two subsets autonomy–localists and equity–localists, 
respectively.  Equity–localists want the same equitable outcome for regional residents as the 
regionalists, but believe that is best achieved through local governments.  See supra Part 
II.C.1.  For example, equity–localists such as Professor Gerald Frug believe that cities are 
hamstrung by limitations set by their state governments and that increased autonomy would 
enhance community participation as well as the governing and decision-making powers of 
municipal bodies.  See Frug, supra note 169, at 1789–90.  While all localists value autonomy, 
the identity of the equity–localists differs from the identity of the autonomy–localists.  
Equity–localists are the minority viewpoint in the localists constituency and tend to be 
academics and social scientists as opposed to individuals with economic or political power to 
effectuate change (unlike autonomy–localists who are generally the parties residing in or 
otherwise protective of the “favored quarter”).  See Cashin, supra note 150, at 1987.  Neither 
autonomy–localists nor equity–localists are satisfied with the current level of power held by 
local governments and believe that local governments need more autonomy through 
increased powers delegated by the states.  See Frug, supra, note 167, at 1789–92; see also 
Briffault, supra note 119, at 28–29.   
307.  See supra notes 149–60 and accompanying text. 
308.  See Frug, supra note 167, at 1764 & n.3; see also supra Part II.C.1. 
309.  See Briffault, supra note 119, at 15, 17–19. 
310.  See MARTINEZ, supra note 304. 
311.  See Briffault, supra note 119, at 24–25. 
312.  Id. at 6. 
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constituent group consists of a wide range of subgroups that includes 
working class and low-income communities (regardless of race or 
ethnicity); residential communities of color (regardless of class); 
immigrants; residents of inner-ring suburbs; central-city residents; 
nonprofit and other charitable organizations; social justice 
organizations; and new regionalists.313  These are the groups that have 
historically been affected, either directly or indirectly, by racial and class 
inequities.314  As such, it should not be a surprise that, for the purposes 
of the regional interest convergence methodology, their interest is 
equity.  Regional equity seeks equal access to opportunities that 
decrease income gaps within a region and remove barriers to regional 
construction of affordable housing and the creation of good jobs that 
pay living wages.315  The animation of the new regionalism movement, 
however, requires the strategic acknowledgement that equity is not the 
primary interest of all regional constituents.  To navigate regional 
interest convergence, I have identified two predominant regional 
constituent groups: localists and regionalists.  What follows is an 
explanation of the regional interest convergence methodology.   
B. Regional Interest Convergence Methodology  
This section introduces the regional interest convergence 
methodology.316  Like the interest convergence methodology, the 
 
313.  See, e.g., supra notes 79–80, 348–50 and accompanying text. 
314.  See Parlow, supra note 21, at 69. 
315.  See Parlow, supra note 21, at 69–70. 
316.  It is important to note that these constituent groups are archetypes of the two 
governance theories.  These are not monolithic categories but expansive labels that represent 
several subcategories of regional constituents.  It is certainly possible that an affluent home 
owner could have regionalists sympathies despite her class status.  Likewise, it is also possible 
that a working class resident of an inner-ring suburb could have localists sympathies despite 
her class status.   
This Article is focused on interest convergence between the localists and regionalists 
constituent groups; however, it is important to recognize that each regional constituent group 
is comprised of subset groups whose interests must be recognized before regional interest 
convergence can be deployed as a new regionalist strategy.  In other words, the localists and 
regionalists constituent groups must each undergo a micro-interest convergence of the 
interests of their respective subsets.  Because each constituent group represents multiple 
subsets of interests, the interests of localists and regionalists must be intra-aligned via a micro-
interest convergence within their respective constituent groups before cross-aligned between 
localists and regionalists.  As such, this Article argues that three types of interest convergence 
are required to move towards new regionalist governance: (1) micro-interest convergence 
among regionalists, (2) micro-interest convergence among localists, and (3) macro-interest 
convergence between localists and regionalists.  Again, this Article is focused on the 
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regional interest convergence methodology contemplates the following 
elements:   multiple constituent groups; distinct interests held by each 
group; a subordinated interest; a method of convergence; and a resulting 
convergence.317  Both of the methodology charts demonstrate a 
transactional perspective that brings to light new and intriguing 
commonalities between the interests identified in Brown and those of 
the localists and regionalists constituent groups.  Specifically, the charts 
reveal that the underlying interests in the Brown and regional interest 
convergence methodologies are similar.  The chart below makes what 
was implicit in Brown explicit—that equity and autonomy questions 
were at the center of Brown.318  The equal access to public education 
interest of blacks in Brown is fundamentally a question of equity—a 
question of equal access and opportunity in public education.  
Unfortunately, this remains a social and political challenge and is one of 
the current platforms of today’s regional equity movement.  Similarly, 
the reputational interests of white elites in Brown are fundamentally a 
question about autonomy, albeit reputational autonomy and self-
governance as opposed to formally designated local government 
autonomy prevalent throughout metropolitan regions today.  White 
elites in Brown wanted control over how the world perceived America’s 
race relations.319  Today, localists want to maintain local control in 
regional spaces.    
  
 
convergence of localists and regionalists interests.  An analysis of micro-interest convergence 
must be undertaken in future scholarship; however, there is support for this idea in Professor 
Bell’s work.  Micro-interest convergence occurred among the white elites in Brown as 
evidenced by the arguments in the amicus briefs.  See Bell, supra note 27, at 524; see also 
supra note 280 and accompanying text. Similarly, blacks in Brown underwent micro-interest 
convergence through community organizing.  See Bell, supra note 27, at 524.  The 
identification of micro-interest convergence as a necessary step for regional interest 
convergence is a nuanced discovery.  It is important because it names and and normalizes the 
interest convergence methodology, thus making it an accessible and replicable strategy for 
subordinated groups.  See, e.g., Yxta Maya Murray, Towards Interest Convergence: Coalition 
Building Requires Connection Within as Well as Without, 33 CAL. W. L. REV. 205 (1997). 
317.  Supra Part III.B. 
318.  See supra notes 237–38 and accompanying text. 
319.  See supra note 235 and accompanying text. 
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Table 2 
Comparison of Brown Interest Convergence and Regional Interest 
Convergence Methodologies 
 
 Brown Interest Convergence Regional Interest 
Convergence  
Constituent 
Groups White Elites Blacks Regionalists Localists 
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1. Multiple Constituent Groups 
Like in Brown, regional interest convergence contemplates two 
constituent groups: localists and regionalists.320  Regional interest 
convergence, therefore, will occur between the localists and regionalists 
constituent groups. 
2. Multiple Interests321 
As in Brown, regional interest convergence contemplates two sets of 
interests, each held by a regional constituent group: autonomy, valued 
by localists,322 and equity, valued by regionalists.323  The interest 
 
320.  See supra Table 2. 
321.  As explained in note 311, each regional constituent group should undergo a micro-
interest convergence within itself to facilitate regional interest convergence between the 
localists and regionalists constituent groups.  See infra note 316 for an outline of these micro-
interest convergence mechanisms.   
322.  The literature discussing interest convergence is not limited to legal scholarship.  
Political scientists have also employed interest convergence mechanisms to explain or predict 
certain outcomes.  See Stacy Bondanella Taninchev, Intergovernmental Organizations and 
Interest Convergence: Does Issue Area Matter? (Prepared for the Annual Meeting of the 
American Political Science Association, Sept. 1−4, 2011, Seattle, W.A.), available at http://pap
ers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1901961, archived at http://perma.cc/8CT6-5UV6.  
Institutional socialization is a form of micro-interest convergence that institutional localists 
can undergo before effectuating regional interest convergence.  See generally David H. 
Bearce & Stacy Bondanella, Intergovernmental Organizations, Socialization, and Member-
State Interest Convergence, 61 INT’L ORG. 703 (2007).  Of particular relevance to this Article 
are convergences of institutional interests, which are the interests of the institutions that have 
a demonstrated regional impact.  In a paper analyzing state behavior in international 
relations, Professor Stacy Bondanella Taninchev explains that “greater interaction” within an 
institution “leads to greater interest convergence over time.”  Bondanella Taninchev, supra, 
at 3.  This form of interest convergence is institutional socialization.  See id.  
Institutional socialization describes the phenomenon that occurs when independent 
members of a singular institution show greater convergence of interest over the course of 
time because of the frequency of contact between the members.  See Bearce & Bondanella, 
supra at 703.  It speaks to the value of social interaction among representatives from various 
institutions who are collectively housed by one umbrella institution to find shared interests.  
Institutional socialization is crucial to achieving interest convergence across and within 
diverse institutions.  Given the range of institutional and individual members of the localists 
subgroups, there are different types of micro-interest convergences that can occur within the 
localist constituent group.  Institutional interests are particularly prevalent in the localists 
constituent group.  See Briffault, supra note 119, at 22.  Specifically, a type of micro-interest 
convergence that institutional localists can undergo before effectuating regional interest 
convergence is institutional socialization.  See Bearce & Bondanella, supra, at 723. 
Institutional socialization explains the informal process by which the attitudes and 
behaviors of independent actors are integrated over the course of their interaction within the 
same institution.  See Bearce & Bondanella, supra, at 706.  In other words, it is likely that the 
interests of individuals who repeatedly interact with each other under the auspices of the 
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convergence theory teaches that the constituents’ interests need not be 
the same for a convergence to occur.324  These two sets of interests are 
 
same organization will integrate over the course of time.  This is true even despite the fact 
that their respective work in the organization is as a representative for another entity (as is 
the case with regional councils of government discussed below).  This would be a micro-
convergence within the localists constituent group. 
323.  Engaged and effective multi-racial and class-based coalitions are essential to the 
revival of new regionalism.  Interest group convergence is the mechanism by which to form 
these coalitions and is the micro-interest convergence for regionalists necessary to facilitate 
regional interest convergence.  The phrase was first coined by Professor Sheryll Cashin, who 
crafted the phrase to describe her advocacy for a process to encourage racial minorities to 
coalesce around their similarities and exercise collective political power in pursuit of shared 
interests that impact each group in the coalition for the ultimate purpose of “achieving 
progressivity through interest group convergence.”  See Cashin, supra note 26, at 256, 265, 
273−74 (coining “interest group convergence”).  Professor Bell’s theory of interest 
convergence explains an outcome produced when two parties’ interests align despite the fact 
that one of the parties is subordinate to the other.  In contrast, Professor Cashin’s theory of 
interest group convergence explains an alignment of similarly situated groups.  See id. at 
272−75.  These groups are the subgroups that comprise the regionalist constituent group; like 
the localists, regionalists must undergo an in-group micro-convergence to facilitate regional 
interest convergence.  See supra Part IV.A.2. 
In developing this theory, Professor Cashin advances the idea of employing interest 
convergence as a strategy—specifically a political strategy—and she argues that interest 
convergence theory is the appropriate strategy for forming multi-racial coalitions to challenge 
racial inequalities and champion progressive legislation.  See id. at 268–291.  Relying on 
political science literature, Professor Cashin identifies the following four preconditions as 
requirements for viable multi-racial coalitions:  
(a) the recognition by the parties involved of their respective self-interests; (b) the 
mutual belief that each party stands to benefit in terms of that self-interest from 
allying with the other or others; (c) the acceptance of the fact that each party has its 
own independent base of power and does not depend for ultimate decision-making 
on a force outside itself; and (d) the realization that the coalition deals with specific 
and identifiable—as opposed to general and vague—goals. 
Id. at 270 (quoting STOKELY CARMICHAEL & CHARLES V. HAMILTON, BLACK POWER: THE 
POLITICS OF LIBERATION IN AMERICA 79–80 (1967)).  Specifically, Professor Cashin argues 
that a “convergence of interests among communities of color, working class[es], and 
progressive whites” could lead to a more effective progressive coalition.  Id. at 255.  In 
making her argument, she reviews the tensions that have historically and are currently 
challenging multi-racial coalitions and explains that determining whether individual groups 
are more motivated by ideology or interest is the most challenging hurdle to the formation of 
multi-racial coalitions.  See id. at 278–81.  Professor Cashin defines “ideology” as “the pre-
existing opinions and attitudes of a particular racial group toward another group.”  Id. at 278.  
She defines interest as “the recognized tactical or strategic advantage that one racial group 
can gain by forming a coalition with another group.”  Id.  Regional organizing is the most 
effective method for overcoming self-interests and accomplishing interest group convergence.  
See infra notes 326–29 and accompanying text.   
324.  See Bell, supra note 27, at 524–25. 
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distinct from each other and, as detailed below, capable of being 
aligned.325 
3. Subordinated Party/Type of Subordination  
As did Brown, regional interest convergence contemplates both race 
and class discrimination, as documented through the story of 
metropolitan development. 
4. Medium for Convergence: Regional Organizing Through Interest-
Based Negotiation 
An interest convergence transaction needs a medium to manage the 
actual convergence of interests and to formalize the result.  In Brown, 
the Supreme Court was the medium for convergence.326 In regional 
interest convergence, as explained below, a possible medium for 
convergence is regional organizing through an interest-based 
negotiation framework327 for the purpose of creating regional alliances 
around equity issues.   
Regional organizing is the extension of community organizing 
beyond neighborhood boundaries to connect similarly situated people 
throughout a metropolitan region.328  “It is not clear . . . that our 
metropolitan policyscape can be changed without a base that can 
consistently challenge and not just mollify elite decision-makers.”329  
Regional organizing efforts seek to build regional coalitions among low-
income and diverse communities by “scaling up” local organizing 
efforts.330  As a primary tool of the regional equity movement, regional 
 
325.  This Article diverges from Professor Bell’s assertion that interest convergence can 
only occur if the dominant party’s status quo remains unchanged.   
326.  See supra Table 1. 
327.  See infra notes 327–49 notes and accompanying text for a discussion of interest-
based negotiation. 
328.  See PASTOR ET AL., supra note 31, at 10. 
329.  See id. at 44.  In accordance with the three strands of the regional equity movement 
discussed earlier, regional organizing has employed a multi-faceted approach based on three 
variants of regionalism: community development regionalism, policy reform regionalism, and 
social movement regionalism.  See id. at 24.  “Community development regionalism has as its 
focus the use of regional tools to achieve particular projects.”  Id. at 38 (emphasis omitted).  
Policy reform regionalism focuses beyond neighborhood boundaries on changes in 
metropolitan policy.  See id.  Social movement regionalism views regionalism as “a vehicle for 
doing politics.”  Id.  
330.  “Metropolitan organizing is about changing the rules of the game so that those who 
have not, will have. . . .  Metropolitan organizing is the new civil rights movement.”  See id. at 
15 (quoting Rev. Cheryl Rivera) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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organizing looks beyond “leveraging regional dynamics for [singular] 
project development” but focuses instead “on how the region itself 
might become fertile ground for an entirely new scale of power-building, 
complete with broader implications for policy and political change.”331 
The regional equity movement is a reform movement that “includes 
policies and practices to promote and manage regional economic growth 
in a way that maximizes benefits for residents of low-income 
communities of color throughout metropolitan regions.”332  The 
movement seeks to build equity concerns into existing local government 
laws and economic development practices to eradicate regional 
inequities.333  Although the regional equity movement originated outside 
of the scope of the regional governance debate, local government law 
and equitable economic development policy and practice are the legal 
and normative standards underlying the regional equity movement.334  
Therefore, it is important to identify intersections between these 
movements to build broader coalitions and maximize support.   
Like the new regionalist movement, the regional equity movement 
began in the 1990s when “social justice advocates recognized the role of 
the metropolitan development patterns in maintaining and exacerbating 
racial and economic disparities in income, wealth, health, and 
opportunity.”335  Like new regionalism, the regional equity movement 
holds that the region is the most appropriate political forum for 
developing and implementing new regional equity strategies to address 
existing regional inequities.336  Fused with market sensitivities, the 
movement is an amalgamation of past social justice movements that is 
 
331.  See id. at 10.  There are gradations of regional organizing.  For example, in his 
book American Metropolitics, Myron Orfield argues that central cities and inner-ring suburbs 
should form “metropolitan coalitions” to overcome the power of the “favored quarter” 
wealthy suburbs.  See ORFIELD, supra note 32, at xii.  For a discussion of the three elements 
of regional power building, see DEAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 177, at 85–158 (listing the 
three elements developing a regional policy agenda, forming deep coalitions, and political 
action).   
332. Angela Glover Blackwell, Promoting Equitable Development, 34 IND. L. REV. 1273, 
1278 (2001).   
333.  See id. at 1278–81.  
334.  See Reynolds, Intergovernmental Cooperation, supra note 194, at 116.  
335.  ANGELA GLOVER BLACKWELL & SARAH TREUHAFT, POLICYLINK, REGIONAL 
EQUITY AND THE QUEST FOR FULL INCLUSION 2 (2008), available at 
http://www.policylink.org/sites/default/files/REGIONALEQUITY_QUEST_FOR_INCLUSI
ON_FINAL.PDF, archived at http://perma.cc/V3LE-U9L2. 
336.  See id. 
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built around analytic, practical, and political components.337  
Analytically, the regional equity movement asserts that our 
metropolitan development patterns need to change because these 
patterns are responsible for our “most challenging urban problems.”338  
The movement’s practical elements consider the limitations of past but 
outdated successes and assert that disparities in housing, economic 
development, and workforce development require “new metropolitan 
strategies” that should be “more effective at generating equitable 
outcomes than either traditional community development efforts or 
broad national policy.”339  Lastly, the political  component asserts “that 
the region is a productive place for new progressive organizing, partly 
because it is on the regional scale that many problems are experienced 
and partly because a confluence of interests make it possible to create 
new sustainable coalitions among unlikely partners.”340  The regional 
equity movement presents a comprehensive framework for 
implementing regional interest convergence. 
In their book This Could Be the Start of Something Big, social 
scientists Manuel Pastor, Chris Benner, and Martha Matsuoka trace the 
progress of regional organizing and determine that the most 
fundamental element necessary for effective regional organizing is the 
identification of links between day-to-day experiences within the region 
and specific equity issues.341  The absence of such links has been a 
challenge for new regionalism since its inception.342  “Sometimes the link 
is not explicitly to ‘regional equity’ as a vision or a goal but rather to 
specific issues of opportunity or inequality that happen to have regional 
dimensions.”343  Such links prevent the movement from appearing too 
abstract and distant from ‘real’ community issues. 
 
337.  See PASTOR ET AL., supra note 31, at 3.  
338.  Id. 
339.  Id.  
340.  Id.  
341.  See id. at 170.  In addition, successful regional organizing campaigns demonstrate 
“common themes of power analysis, leadership development, and community organizing.”  
See id. at 15. 
342.  Id. at 170–71. 
343.  Id. at 171.  These links can also serve to raise a “regional consciousness” or 
“metropolitan identity,” particularly if it is true that, while people may pledge devotion to 
cities, states, and the nation, there is no such allegiance for regions.  For most people, 
“regional identity” is an academic concept.  See Briffault, supra note 173.  This is despite the 
fact that the daily lives of most people extend beyond the locality in which they live, including 
the places where they work, shop, visit friends and family, and are entertained.  See id. 
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Regionalism cannot be imposed as an external solution—and 
when presented as an abstract concept, it frequently carries little 
sense of immediacy in people’s lives.  Thus, it does not serve as a 
mobilizing force.  Nor are academic discussions of regional 
policies . . . necessarily compelling; such conversations tend to 
launch conferences, not social movements.  By contrast, in those 
efforts that are contributing to building a social movement, 
regionalism is not perceived as an external concept or abstract 
notion.  Instead, using popular education based on sophisticated 
research and analysis, regional equity organizers can 
demonstrate how regional strategies can bring community and 
individual aspirations to life.344 
Interest-based negotiation is an answer to the question of how to 
practically approach coalition building among regional constituents.  It 
is one thing to say that regional community coalitions are an important 
force in addressing regional poverty; it is another to document how 
those coalitions can form and successfully interact with local 
government structures.  As a multidimensional challenge, regional 
inequity is particularly suited for interest-based negotiation.  
“Multidimensional problem-solving refers to the breadth of issues 
relevant to both the negotiation process and outcome, and the fact that 
they will be perceived differently by the stakeholders depending on their 
own perspectives, interests, and objectives in the negotiation.”345  
Negotiation specialists have identified four steps to completing a 
successful interest-based negotiation for multidimensional interests: (i) 
revealing interests, (ii) enlarging interests, (iii) enlightened interests, 
and (iv) aligning interests.346  Because interest-based negotiation skills 
 
344.  PASTOR ET AL., supra note 31, at 173. 
345.  Leonard J. Marcus, Barry C. Dorn & Eric J. McNulty, The Walk in the Woods: A 
Step-by-Step Method for Facilitating Interest-Based Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, 
NEGOTIATION J. 337, 339–40 (2012).  “Problem solving may be unidimensional [(me for me)], 
two-dimensional [(me against you)], or multidimensional.”  Id.  Unidimensional and two-
dimensional negotiators employ classic “adversarial conflict.”  Id. at 340.  This means that the 
negotiators are focused on “triumphing” over the opposing party by learning their 
vulnerabilities and developing strategies to exploit them.  Id. 
346. Step one, revealing interests, requires the parties to reveal their interests by 
identifying and articulating what they “hope or need to gain or achieve in the negotiation.”  
Marcus, et al., supra note 345, at 342.  During this step, the parties are instructed to listen 
actively and to talk to each other in a nonadversarial fashion with the goal being that the 
parties will achieve self-awareness and appreciate the interests of the other party.  Id.  The 
second step, enlarging interests, requires the parties collectively to list points of agreement 
and disagreement.  Id. at 343.  This process helps highlight commonalities and enlarge 
interests.  Id.  Step three, enlightened interests, is facilitated by the discussion that occurs 
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are centered on identifying and meeting the underlying needs of all 
parties involved in a negotiation, these negotiation practices dovetail 
nicely with the transactional application of interest convergence 
methodology.347  The principal attributes of interest-based negotiation 
are “stakeholder interaction” and “bargaining that is based on mutual 
interests and overlapping objectives” to achieve “a mutually beneficial 
solution.”348  Interest-based negotiation skills serve to counteract power 
imbalances between the parties.  This is particularly important for 
marginalized communities seeking to interact with local governments.349  
To date, lawyers have employed interest-based negotiation techniques 
in transactions and disputes involving private parties.350  The suggestion 
here is that interest-based negotiation might be deployed as a large-scale 
grassroots effort for regional alliance building, particularly through the 
work of the nonprofit organizations such as those listed below.351  
Nonprofit organizations such as PolicyLink352 the Advancement 
 
during step two.  See id. at 344.  Step three is an “exploratory and creative brainstorming 
process” that encourages “creative problem solving and [allows parties] to practice mini-deal 
making.”  Id.  The parties rank the list of ideas generated during the brainstorming session by 
a value system that indicates the level of agreement between the parties (e.g., 1 could 
demonstrate total agreement).  Id. at 345.  Each idea is individually discussed, and, after the 
first ranking, the “maybes” are discussed to determine if these issues can be bumped up to 
show total agreement or bumped down to show total disagreement.  Id.  Step four, aligning 
interests, “is the conclusive bargaining phase.”  Id.  Here, the parties finalize the deal.  Id.  
“Ultimately, such negotiations result in a deal because each party has achieved enough 
recognizable gain: they each ‘get’ something.  What they each get certainly does not need to 
be identical, and it does not need to be of equal monetary value; it is gauged by the relative 
value it has for each stakeholder.”  Id. at 346. 
347. See, e.g., Jim Hilbert, Collaborative Lawyering: A Process for Interest-Based 
Negotiation, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1083 (2010); see also supra Part III.B. 
348.  Marcus et al., supra note 345, at 339, 340. 
349.  Roger Fisher and William Ury are widely credited with being the first to articulate 
principles of interest-based negotiation in their book Getting to Yes.  See generally ROGER 
FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING 
IN (Bruce Patton ed., 2d ed. 1991) (using the phrase “principled negotiation” instead of 
“interest-based negotiation”).  Scholars such as Richard Abel have argued that negotiation is 
an informal mechanism for justice that increases state control over the disempowered.  See 
Richard L. Abel, Introduction to 1 THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN 
EXPERIENCE 1, 6, 11 (Richard L. Abel ed., 1982).  Here, interest-based negotiation in the 
service of regional interest convergence is envisioned to be an exercise in grassroots 
advocacy.  See id.   
350.  See Marcus et al., supra note 345, at 338–39. 
351.  See infra Part IV.C. 
352.  Mission Statement, POLICYLINK, http://www.policylink.org/about/mission-statemen
t (last visited Jan. 18, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/Y6MT-4U5H (“PolicyLink connects 
the work of people on the ground to the creation of sustainable communities of opportunity 
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Project,353 the Gamaliel Foundation,354 and Strategic Concepts in 
Organizing & Policy Education (S.C.O.P.E),355 serve regional organizing 
missions and are working to build coalitions that cut across class, ethnic, 
racial, and ethno-religious differences.  These organizing efforts, 
however, are not without challenges.  To date, activists have had more 
success building broadband coalitions around singular equity issues 
(such as living wage campaigns and black and brown coalitions among 
African American and Latino youth) but have had less success building 
coalitions that run throughout the equity issues contained in a region.356  
Interest based negotiation frameworks could work with adjustments to 
current practices that facilitate implementation for coalition-building 
negotiations, but that inquiry deserves full attention in future 
scholarship.  “Addressing metropolitan policy requires that groups 
develop new and different sorts of technical capacities; and shifting 
policy and political aim from the neighborhood to the region requires a 
 
that allow everyone to participate and prosper.  Such communities offer access to quality jobs, 
affordable housing, good schools, transportation, and the benefits of healthy food and 
physical activity.”) 
353.  Mission, ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, http://www.advancementproject.org/pages/mis
sion (last visited Jan. 18, 2015) , archived at http://perma.cc/4FFL-UN2P. (“Advancement 
Project is a next generation, multi-racial civil rights organization.  Rooted in the great human 
rights struggles for equality and justice, we exist to fulfill America’s promise of a caring, 
inclusive and just democracy.  We use innovative tools and strategies to strengthen social 
movements and achieve high impact policy change.”).  
354.  About Gamaliel, GAMALIEL, http://www.gamaliel.org/AboutUs.aspx (last visited 
Jan. 18, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/H8AQ-KZMT; see also Gamaliel, ROCHESTER 
ALLIANCE COMMUNITIES TRANSFORMING SOC’Y, INC. (ROC/ACTS), https://sites.google.co
m/site/rochesteracts/gamaliel (last visited Oct. 29, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/4JZA-
ZQJJ (“Gamaliel is a grassroots network of non-partisan, faith-based organizations in 17 U.S. 
states, South Africa and the United Kingdom, that organizes to empower ordinary people to 
effectively participate in the political, environmental, social and economic decisions affecting 
their lives. . . .  Gamaliel provides leadership training, helps build community organizations, 
and leads local and national social justice campaigns.”).  
355.  Our Mission, SCOPE, http://scopela.org/about-us/mission-history/ (last visited Jan. 
18, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/77AN-7Q2C; see also Juliana D. Norwood, SCOPE’s 
Novel Approach to Bringing Neighborhood Organizations Together, OUR WEEKLY L.A. 
(Oct. 17, 2012, 5:00 PM), http://ourweekly.com/news/2012/oct/17/scopes-novel-approach-to-
bringing-neighborhood/, archived at http://perma.cc/BRA5-5N4T (“Strategic Concepts in 
Organizing and Policy Education (SCOPE) builds grassroots power to eliminate the 
structural barriers to social and economic opportunities for poor and disenfranchised 
communities.  SCOPE combines community organizing, leadership development, strategic 
alliance building, research, training and capacity building, and policy advocacy to pursue its 
mission at the local, state and national levels.”).  
356.  See PASTOR ET AL., supra note 31, at 148. 
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leap of faith that can be difficult to sustain.”357  As such, something out 
of the ordinary is required to advance regional equity.  As an animator 
of the new regionalism movement, regional interest convergence 
provides that opportunity for the extraordinary.  New regionalism is the 
bridge between regionalists and localists, and as demonstrated in the 
Venn diagram below, regional interest convergence facilitates that 
alliance.  Until now, there has been no strategy to capitalize on this 
alignment of interests.  Now that regional constituents and their 
interests have been identified, the next section will briefly discuss the 








357.  Id. at 14. 
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C. Resulting Convergence: Regional Interest Convergence in Practice  
The convergence methodologies uniquely chart paths to coalition 
building.  In Brown, the resulting interest convergence was the Court’s 
holding to desegregate public schools.358  Interest convergence theory 
holds that this occurred because of the alignment between the interests 
of blacks and white elites.359  As a new regionalist strategy, regional 
interest convergence holds that the resulting convergence of an 
alignment of the interests of localists and regionalists can advance 
regional equity while maintaining local government autonomy.360  While 
the goal of this Article is not to maintain any constituent’s status quo, 
it’s worth noting that, to some extent, regional interest convergence 
preserves local government autonomy because it does not depend upon 
the creation of any new state legislative avenues for its 
implementation.361  However, the advancement of regional equity must 
necessarily impair localism’s ability to exclude residents from affluent 
communities because “[p]rivate biases may be outside the reach of the 
law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.”362  
Barriers to regional equity can, therefore, be challenged by using 
interest-based negotiation to mount effective regional organizing 
campaigns to align the interests of localists and regionalists and promote 
regional interest convergence.  Regional interest convergence can 
incentivize the behavior of members of constituent groups who have 
misperceived their self-interests as opposed to those who intentionally 
discriminate based on race or class.363 
To attempt to alleviate metropolitan poverty, it is important to 
develop poverty alleviation mechanisms for both urban and suburban 
communities.  As a new regionalist strategy, regional interest 
convergence is designed to meet the needs of both of these communities 
because it forces the identification of each regional constituent’s 
 
358.  See Bell, supra note 27, at 524; see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 
(1954).   
359.  See supra notes 233–40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the interests in 
Brown. 
360.  See supra Table 2. 
361.  See infra Part IV.B.  
362.  Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).   
363.  See, e.g., Daniel Coleman, Rich People Just Care Less, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2013, at 
SR12 (reporting on research that people with “the most social power pay scant attention to 
those with little such power”). 
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interest, including the interests of both urban and suburban 
communities.   
Ultimately, for a regional equity movement to capture the 
national imagination fully and contribute to a revitalization of 
progressive politics around the country, the varying 
constituencies need to develop a closer communication and 
coordinating structure throughout the country.  They need to 
build on the telling moments of social combustion—starting at a 
local and regional scale with the modest epiphanies that come 
when city dwellers and suburbanites reach out to each other 
about more sustainable development, when the working poor 
and the middle class see a common fate resulting from economic 
insecurity, and when blacks, whites, Latinos, Asians, and others 
find identity not only in their ethnicity but also in their regional 
or community connections.364   
This section identifies mechanisms that can serve as conceptual 
anchors for regional interest convergence efforts.  Each of these should 
be explored in future scholarship; however, here they generally fall into 
one of the following categories: economic development, regional 
planning, and strategic partnerships between community groups and 
business.  Each of the anchors would appear in the blended section of 
the Venn diagram on page 821 and is briefly outlined below.  It is 
helpful to identify rationales for regional interest convergence that 
explain its capacity to work for the benefit of both localists and 
regionalists—demonstrating why either regional constituent would want 
to participate in regional interest convergence. 
[T]he political challenge of regionalism in any form is to show 
middle- and lower middle-class voters in suburbs with low and 
declining property tax values that their interests converge with 
central cities, that tax base sharing will improve their services 
while lowering their tax taxes, that it will restrict their fair 
housing commitments to regional standards, and that it will 
stabilize their communities against further decline.365 
 
364.  PASTOR ET AL., supra note 31, at 215. 
365.  Troutt, supra note 68, at 1175.   
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The answers to this challenge lie in the nation’s rapidly changing 
demographics and in communities such as Ferguson, Missouri.366 
The country is projected to become majority-minority by 2044.367  
With these demographics shifts in population will come shifts in 
attitudes about class and race that will make the facilitation of regional 
interest convergence easier to navigate as we move farther and farther 
away from the black/white dichotomy,368 and the country will suffer in 
the global marketplace if the majority of its young workforce is 
underprepared and undereducated for the existing job market.369  Also, 
while it might seem alarmist to point to Ferguson, Missouri, as a 
harbinger of things to come, decades of class and race discrimination 
have produced an untold number of communities like Ferguson, where 
the poor population doubled and the unemployment rate was over 13% 
between 2010 and 2012.370  Regional interest convergence can serve as a 
tool to build regional alliances among communities like Ferguson to 
strengthen their social and political power within a metropolitan region. 
Both localists and regionalists would benefit from regional interest 
convergence efforts in economic development activities, particularly 
those aimed at distressed cities in metropolitan regions.371  Distressed 
cities are those that are financially insolvent but have not yet declared 
 
366.  Daniel J. McGraw, Ferguson: Race and the Inner-Ring Suburb, BELT MAG. (Aug. 
14, 2014), http://beltmag.com/ferguson-race-inner-ring-suburb/, archived at http://perma.cc/U
N36-5KGP. 
367.  SANDRA L. COLBY & JENNIFER M. ORTMAN, PROJECTIONS OF THE SIZE AND 
COMPOSITION OF THE U.S. POPULATION: 2014 TO 2060, at 9 (2015), available at 
http://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2015/demo/p25-1143.pdf; see 
also McGraw, supra note 366. 
368.  Although this will undoubtedly bring other challenges.  See, e.g., Cashin, supra 
note 150. 
369.  In today’s labor market, most good jobs require a higher education.  See Four 
Reasons to Use the Equity Frame in Your Campaign, BOLDER ADVOCACY BLOG (April 15, 
5:24 PM 2014), http://bolderadvocacy.org/blog/4-reasons-why-equity-is-the-superior-growth-
model-for-the-nation-and-3-ways-to-implement-equitable-growth, available at http://perma.cc
/LWH8-DUG4.  In two decades the majority of all young American workers will be people of 
color; however, only 28% of black and Latino workers, 15% of Latino immigrants, and 24% 
of Native Americans and Alaskan natives have an associate’s degree.  See id. 
370.  See Elizabeth Kneebone, Ferguson, Mo. Emblematic of Growing Suburban 
Poverty, BROOKINGS, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/the-avenue/posts/2014/08/15-ferguson-
suburban-poverty (Aug. 15, 2014, 2:30 PM), archived at http://perma.cc/8A6D-585V. 
371.  Distressed cities are cities that have not declared bankruptcy but are in an acute 
struggle for economic stability.  See Liz Farmer, Distress Signals, GOVERNING, Mar. 2014, at 
42, 44. 
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Chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy.372  While currently on the rise in some 
parts of the country, property values plummeted across the nation 
during the housing crisis, shrinking the value and volume of property tax 
payments received by state and local governments.373  These entities 
responded in various ways, with state governments undergoing dramatic 
organizational changes to address record budget short falls.374  In 
addition to cutting back on social services, many state governments are 
delegating responsibilities to local governments without providing 
additional financial resources.375  Localities, in turn, have been forced to 
explore extreme measures to address their current state of financial 
instability376 as the citizenry of numerous states and localities have been 
rocked by battles over public pension funds.377  Because the economic 
stability of localities varies in accordance with a locality’s available tax 
base, the loss of state aid and tax revenue impacts localities within the 
same region differently—intensifying regional disparities and increasing 
the number of localities in distress.378  There is a shared sentiment 
 
372.  See Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118 (2014); 
Farmer, supra note 371.  
373.  See supra notes 60, 191 and accompanying text.   
374.  For example, California is in the process of dissolving more than 400 of its 
redevelopment agencies due to budget constraints.  See Maura Dolan, Jessica Garrison & 
Anthony York, Court Deals Costly Blow to Cities, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2011, at A1.  Other 
states have severely reduced employment in state-wide public services such as public 
education.  See Dennis Cauchon, Public Workforce Slashed at Local Level: 5 States Account 
for Majority of Losses, USA TODAY, Oct. 29, 2010, at 1A.   
375.  Local governments are losing access to significant financial resources from their 
state governments.  See Alan Greenblatt, The Hand-Off, GOVERNING, Apr. 2011, at 24, 24. 
376.  For example, cities such as Richmond, California; Irvington, New Jersey; and 
North Las Vegas, Nevada have explored the feasibility of using eminent domain to slow the 
rate of home foreclosures.  See Shaila Dewan, A City Invokes Seizure Laws to Save Homes, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 30, 2013, at A1.  In Richmond, where almost half of the city’s homeowners 
with mortgages owe more than the home’s current worth, the city proposes to purchase these 
loans at fair market value, write down the debt, and allow the homeowner to refinance the 
mortgage at more favorable terms through partnerships with government programs or 
nonprofit organizations.  See id.  According to the proposal, if the city’s offer to purchase is 
declined, it will then use eminent domain to obtain the loan.  See id.  Not surprisingly, the 
banking and real estate industries oppose these sorts of proposals, which is somewhat ironic 
given their support of the use of eminent domain during the urban renewal heydays.  See id.; 
Justin Yurkanin, Mortgage Relief Plan in North Las Vegas Ignites Morality Debate, LAS VEGAS 
REV. J. (Jul. 14, 2013, 9:03 AM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/multimedia/mortgage-relief-
plan-in-north-las-vegas-ignites-morality-debate.   
377.  The most infamous to date is the City of Detroit’s bankruptcy filing.  See, e.g., 
Rana Foroohar, Broken City: How Detroit’s Epic Bankruptcy Could Help the Rest of the 
Country, TIME, Aug. 5, 2013, at 22. 
378.  See supra notes 60, 191 and accompanying text. 
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among localities that “[t]he federal government has all the money, states 
have all the power and cities have all the problems.”379  When the first 
suburbs were formed, cities relied on property taxes as the main source 
of revenue for funding public services.380  That model has been in 
decline for decades and a suitable replacement has yet to be 
discovered.381  As a result, cities are contemplating a host of austerity 
measures that are particularly focused on service delivery but could 
impact their neighboring suburbs as well.  Suburban communities, 
including affluent communities, need to be vested in the economic 
health of their central cities   
Because regional planning is largely an advisory activity that 
requires the voluntary participation of localities, regional interest 
convergence efforts in regional planning should revolve around 
incentive programs.  Current federal funding practices for community 
and economic development programs are fertile ground for regional 
interest convergence.  One program that is particularly relevant is the 
Sustainable Communities Regional Planning Grant Program.382  This 
program rewards applications for funding that demonstrate regional or 
multijurisdictional impact.  This is because localists and regionalists 
interests converge where the goal is federal funding for affordable 
housing and community and economic development programs.383  Many 
formerly affluent suburban communities are confronting challenges in 
their boundaries ranging from economic harms associated with 
foreclosed and abandoned homes384  to the emerging suburban single 
family rental housing market, which is becoming increasingly tight and 
being driven by investment firms that are bundling and securitizing the 
rent payments.385  Innovative regional planning through regional interest 
convergence would promote regional affordable housing plans and the 
equitable expansion of regional transit.   
 
379.  See Farmer, supra note 14. 
380.  See id. 
381.  See id. 
382.  See Sustainable Communities Regional Planning Grants, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & 
URB. DEV., http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/economic_resilience/
sustainable_communities_regional_planning_grants (last visited Jan. 18, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/PMP8-FKWM. 
383.  See Alexander, supra note 25, at 649 (presenting the Sustainable Communities 
Regional Planning Grant Program as an example of a new regionalism). 
384.  See, e.g., Al Yoon, Blackstone Offers Bond Tied to Rental Income, WALL ST. J., 
Nov. 1, 2013, at C4.   
385.  See id. 
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Innovative strategic partnerships between community groups and 
business interests also present opportunities for regional interest 
convergence.  “[W]ith a clearer mutuality of interest, regional equity 
coalitions should attract many more politically powerful interests, 
including smart-growth, transportation alternatives, and environmental 
advocates.”386  Thinking and acting regionally have been part of business 
and industry strategic plans for decades.387  Advocacy efforts are 
catching up.  From the civil rights movement to the Occupy Wall Street 
movement, coalitions are being formed to advocate for social and 
economic justice.388  In the absence of regional governance structures, 
business interests and public–private partnerships direct regional 
growth,389 subordinating community interests to institutional interests in 
regional affairs.390  Regional interest convergence can counter that 
outcome because it speaks to both localist “issues of economic 
competitiveness” and regionalist issues of “sustainability in ways that 
appeal beyond the usual low-income constituencies.”391  Community 
activists and business interests generally mistrust each other because 
community activists’ emphasis on economic and social justice for 
residents typically does not seemingly align with the economic and profit 
emphasis of business interests.392  However, the expansive geography of 
regions may prove fruitful for historical alliances between business and 
regional equity advocates.393  In fact, “regional equity organizers tend to 
take market realities into account” because “[t]hey know that business 
can make money and do good in underserved communities, and they 
understand that companies need to remain economically viable while 
also paying higher wages.”394 
Indeed, this helps to explain why equity issues are sometimes 
slipped in through the backdoor of efforts to promote 
competitiveness: since elites stand to lose ground in any direct 
 
386.  Troutt, supra note 68, at 1189.   
387.  See generally DEAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 177. 
388.  See, e.g., Judy Lubin, The ‘Occupy’ Movement: Emerging Protest Forms and 
Contested Urban Spaces, 25 BERKELEY PLAN. J. 184 (2012). 
389.  PASTOR ET AL., supra note 31, at 6–7.  This is reminiscent of the rise of business 
and public–private interests in inner-city development.   
390.  Id.  This is similar to the lack of import afforded central-city residents impacted by 
urban redevelopment projects. 
391.  Id. at 3.  
392.  See id. at 183. 
393.  See id. at 183–84. 
394.  Id. at 184. 
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redistribution, they will be more persuaded by strategies that aid 
the economy directly—and [through direct efforts] will also help 
the poor.395 
There are, of course, barriers to regional interest convergence.  
These stem from general counterarguments to regionalism to specific 
challenges to the interest convergence theory itself.  Professor Bell 
himself acknowledged that there are some limitations to the 
applicability of the interest convergence theory.396  The strongest 
barriers to regional interest convergence are (1) overcoming the self-
interests of the various regional constituents, (2) limited financial 
resources, and (3) limited political will.397  These barriers, however, are 
not insurmountable, particularly as the number of distressed localities 
continues to grow, the nation’s demographics change, and regional 
organizing efforts gain further traction.  The number of cities 
experiencing financial instability and experimenting with new austerity 
measures is forcing both urban and suburban leaders to identify 
complimentary interests and call for more collaboration and increased 
political support for regional efforts.398 
 
395.  Id. at 44.  Many commentators have highlighted the fact that eliminating poverty in 
a region is good for the businesses in the region.  See, e.g., Manuel Pastor, Growing Together: 
New Poverty Policy for New Times (prepared for the Charles Steward Mott Foundation 
“Defining Poverty Reduction Strategies” Project, Aug. 2008), available at http://www.brookin
gs.edu/~/media/Events/2008/9/29%20poverty/pastor_paper.PDF, archived at http://perma.cc/9
T9P-R3ZH.  A more fundamental point about interest convergence theory has to be made at 
this juncture.  Much of the critique surrounding Bell’s interest convergence theory concerned 
what some viewed to be a pessimistic outlook on human nature in general and race relations 
in particular.  See, e.g., Cashin, supra note 26, at 254–55.  Bell’s theory essentially maintains 
that a successful interest convergence would advance the cause of the minority party without 
negatively altering the status quo of the majority.  See Bell, supra note 27, at 523–33.  
Regardless of whether one subscribes to this view or a broader articulation of Bell’s theory, a 
new regionalist approach to local government interest convergence could actually improve 
the status quo of local governments.  As explained earlier, a new regionalist approach would 
provide for a regional governance form that preserved local government autonomy.  See 
supra Part IV.A.1.  Therefore, if local governments’ interest converged through the adoption 
of a new regionalist model of governance, then local governments could obtain the benefits of 
regional equity evidenced by a reduction in poverty and the region’s improved ability to 
participate in the global market place. 
396.  See Bell supra note 27, at 523. 
397.  See, e.g., Justin Driver, supra note 241 (noting defining common interests, 
accommodating diverse interest, and sustainability of converged interest as challenges to the 
interest convergence theory); see also Cashin, supra note 150, at 2015–27 (discussing barriers 
to new regionalism).  
398.  See Farmer, supra note 14.  
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V. CONCLUSION  
Poverty is no longer concentrated on certain vulnerable populations 
in central cities and, like a true epidemic, is spreading into the suburbs.  
Regional inequities consistently worsen, and localized mechanisms for 
poverty alleviation are insufficient methods to address the problem.399  
News headlines and nightly news broadcasts are replete with phrases 
such as “the shrinking middle class” and “class warfare.”400  To date, the 
response to this “class crisis” has yielded mixed results.  The federal 
government has affirmatively entered the conversation by taking such 
steps as creating the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.401  In 
addition, a new generation of grassroots movements has used organizing 
lessons from past movements, such as the Civil Rights Movement, to 
create new forms of protest.402  Given the breadth of the economic 
issues, organizers have experienced challenges launching a sustainable 
and focused offensive against economic injustice.403  Regional organizing 
efforts, however, are becoming more coordinated and constructed for a 
long-term engagement.404   
As dire as the effects of the financial crisis are, it is important to 
realize that they are the facts of a new regional geography.  New 
proposals have to meet the needs of the new regional spaces.  Even past 
proposals that were successful have to be revised to meet the new 
regional reality so that regions are not ignored as relevant areas for 
addressing problems currently conceived of as purely local.405  The 
 
399.  See Scott L. Cummings, Recentralization: Community Economic Development and 
the Case for Regionalism, 8 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 131 (2004).   
400.  See, e.g., Michael R. Bloomberg, Federal Budgets and Class Warfare, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 29, 2012, at A19; Nelson D. Schwartz, The Middle Class Is Steadily Eroding. Just Ask the 
Business World., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2014, at A1; Bob Burnett, Class Warfare: The 2014 
Election, HUFFINGTON POST (June 6, 2014, 10:58 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bob-
burnett/class-warfare-the-2014-election_b_5459057.html (last updated Aug. 6, 2014, 5:59 
AM), archived at http://perma.cc/58KL-L436; Brian Darling, America’s Middle Class Is 
Shrinking. So Who Is to Blame?, MAILONLINE (Aug. 29, 2012, 3:24 PM), http://www.dailymai
l.co.uk/debate/article-2194390/Americas-middle-class-shrinking-So-blame.html, (last updated 
Aug. 29, 2012, 9:56 AM), archived at http://perma.cc/7UET-XSNF.   
401.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 1011, 124 Stat. 1376, 1964 (2010); see also About Us, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION 
BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/8QRX-NRAX. 
402.  See, e.g., Lubin, supra note 388. 
403.  See supra note 216 and accompanying text. 
404.  See Lubin, supra note 388, at 184–87. 
405.  See JACOBS, supra note 2, at 410 (commenting on the general planning process and 
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recent collective efforts of the federal, state, and local governments and 
grassroots economic justice movements demonstrate the country’s 
readiness for a national conversation about class and inequity, 
specifically, regional equity.  The regional interest convergence 
mechanism proposed in this Article is not a panacea but a foundational  
framework for navigating both the persistent poverty that has plagued 
central cities for decades and the rise in suburban poverty.  “This is no 
time for romantic illusions and empty philosophical debates . . . .  This is 
a time for action. . . .  What is needed is a strategy for change, a tactical 
program.”406  Regional interest convergence responds to that call. 
 
quoting an unnamed individual).   
406.  MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE: CHAOS OR 
COMMUNITY? 59 (1967). 
